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INTRODUCTION
T HE practice of allowing trademark holders to recover the gains of
trademark infringers has a long and accepted history in trademark
law.' Before the merger of law and equity, a trademark holder who
brought an action at law for damages could seek to recover the in-
fringer's profits as a surrogate measure of the trademark holder's own
injury for lost profits on diverted sales. Even when a trademark
holder sought an injunction in equity, early courts allowed the trade-
mark holder to obtain, in the same action, an accounting of the in-
fringer's profits.' Today, after the merger of law and equity, these
practices continue.' In fact, the infringer's profits are among the cate-
gories of monetary relief specifically authorized when the trademark
holder elects to proceed under the Lanham Act.'
Of course, not every remedy available to a trademark holder is
designed to recover the gains of infringers. For example, the most
commonly sought remedy is an injunction to halt further unauthorized
use of a confusingly similar brandname.5 In addition, some monetary
1. For an historical overview of the development of trademark remedies, see
James M. Koelemay, Jr., Monetary Relief for Trademark Infringement Under the Lan-
ham Act, 72 Trademark Rep. 458 (1982).
2. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 37 cmt. b (1995) [hereinafter
Restatement Third] ("Accountings of profits .... initially granted as ancillary relief
.... thus permit[ ] an award of monetary and injunctive relief in the same action.").
3. See generally 1A Jerome Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice § 8.08[3]
(1995) (discussing the balancing "of equitable factors in determining whether to
award an accounting of profits"); 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks
and Unfair Competition §§ 30.25-26 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing courts' ability to aug-
ment compensatory damages by exercising their equity power to grant remedial re-
lief); Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37(i) (stating that an infringer is "liable for
net profits... resulting from the unlawful conduct"). Of the remedies typically avail-
able in trademark actions, the one that measures the gains of trademark infringement
is an accounting of profits. Id. § 35-37.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994) (codifying section 35(a) of the Lanham Act). Sec-
tion 35(a) is quoted, in pertinent part, infra in the text accompanying note 33. Unless
specifically noted, this Article examines the award of an accounting of profits without
distinguishing actions for deceptive marketing from actions for trademark infringe-
ment; nor does this Article distinguish actions at common law from actions under
legislation, whether the Lanham Act or state legislation. See Restatement Third,
supra note 2, § 37 cmt. a (stating that analogous rules apply in all contexts).
5. Injunctive relief is popular, not only because an injunction halts continuing
infringement, but also because compensatory damages may be unavailable:
[T]he equitable remedy of an injunction was traditionally available only
when the remedy of damages was inadequate .... Frequently, the harm is
not reparable by an award of monetary relief because of the difficulty of
proving the amount of loss and a causal connection with the defendant's
wrongful conduct. Thus, the judicial preference for injunctive relief in unfair
competition cases is not an exception to ordinary remedial principles, but
rather an application of those principles in a context in which injunctive re-
lief is ordinarily the most appropriate remedy.
Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 35 cmt. a (citation omitted); see also id. § 36 cmt. b
("Because of the difficulty of establishing the fact and extent of loss attributable to
[trademark infringement], the equitable action for injunctive relief became the pre-
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trademark holder lost because the infringer failed to obtain a license
and pay a royalty. 10
When a trademark holder seeks to recover the gains of a trademark
infringer, trademark law provides the remedy of an accounting of the
infringer's profits." The rules that govern an accounting evolved in
different contexts to serve a variety of rationales. 12 For example,
while the historical origins of an accounting are usually thought to lie
in equity,13 accountings also have independent origins in common
1986) (holding that a damage award which included lost franchise fees was not specu-
lative but based, instead, upon a reasonable approximation) (citations omitted); see
also Sands, 34 F.3d at 1350-51 (noting the difficulties of determining "probable hap-
penings at a hypothetical bargaining table between parties that might well have never
chosen to bargain with each other on a voluntary basis"); Bandag, 750 F.2d at 920
("Royalties normally received for the use of a mark may be a proper measure, if that
measure ... bears a rational relationship to the rights appropriated." (emphases
omitted)).
10. Sands, 34 F.3d at 1350 (providing that a reasonable royalty "reflect[s] the ac-
tual loss" of the trademark holder); Ramada Inns, 804 F.2d at 1565 (stating that a
reasonable royalty measures the loss of royalty payments during the period of in-
fringement). Some courts erroneously approach the award of a reasonable royalty as
though the award measures the defendant's profits. See, eg., United States Olympic
Comm. v. Union Sport Apparel, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 526, 531 (E.D. Va. 1983) ("De-
fendants' wrongful profits also may be measured alternatively by the amount of
money that would have been charged by plaintiff for the authorized association of
goods in the categories of defendants' goods, since this is the amount which defend-
ants, by their infringement, have saved.")
11. The Restatement Third describes an accounting in terms which suggest that an
accounting provides a comprehensive measure of the gains of trademark infringe-
ment. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37 cmt. a ("An accounting of profits
measures and transfers to the plaintiff the gains resulting to the defendant from the
wrongful conduct.").
Although an accounting of the infringer's profits has sometimes been used as "an
approximate measure of the plaintiff's damages," id, the conceptual distinction be-
tween monetary remedies that measure the gains of trademark infringers and those
that measure the harm to the trademark holders is clear and accepted. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(a) (1994) (listing separately "defendant's profits" and "any damages sustained
by the plaintiff"); Minnesota Pet-Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 843 F.
Supp. 506, 511 (D. 1Mnn. 1993) (separately analyzing a "request for an accounting" as
distinct from a "request for damages [which] will be considered as a request for actual
damages [the trademark holder] may have suffered" (citation and emphasis omitted));
see also Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. a ("Damages measure ... the loss
suffered by the plaintiff. An accounting of profits measures the defendant's gain
rather than the plaintiff's loss .... ").
12. This is true with regard to monetary remedies in general- For example, be-
cause early courts of equity granted monetary relief, "monetary awards were subject
to traditional equitable principles" and today those principles "remain applicable to
claims for monetary relief at common law." Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36
cmt. b; see also id. § 36 cmt. g (providing that "recovery of damages ... [are] subject
to equitable principles both at common law and under the Lanham Act"). Thus, equi-
table principles guide the award of monetary relief today, regardless of whether the
cause of action is styled as one in equity or at law. In fact, all remedies authorized by
§ 35(a) of the Lanham Act, including monetary awards that compensate, are "subject
to the principles of equity." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
13. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Cahill, 330 F. Supp. 354, 355 (W.D. Okla. 1971) ("Plain-
tiff's suit for injunctive relief and an equitable accounting relating to trademark in-
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remedies are designed to compensate the trademark holder for inju-
ries that the trademark holder suffered because of infringement.6
These damages typically measure the injury to the trademark holder
in terms of lost profits on diverted sales7 and injury to goodwill.' An-
other compensatory remedy, the award of a reasonable royalty, is
used less frequently? These damages measure the revenues that the
ferred remedy."); it § 36 cmt. c ("An injunction is the most common remedy in un-
fair competition cases.").
Section 34 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994), authorizes courts to grant
injunctions in actions brought under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
Injunctions also are available in actions brought under state common law as well as
state trademark registration, unfair competition, and antidilution statutes. See Re-
statement Third, supra note 2, § 35 cmt. a ("The principles stated in this Section gov-
em the appropriateness and scope of injunctive relief under these various statutory
provisions as well as injunctive relief in actions at common law."); see also id. § 36
cmt. a ("[A]ntidilution statutes ... generally provide only for injunctive relief.").
6. See generally Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 (summarizing the rules
regarding recovery of "pecuniary loss" to a trademark holder).
7. See id. § 36(2)(a) (including among types of pecuniary loss to a trademark
holder, "loss resulting ... from sales or other revenues lost because of the actor's
conduct").
8. See id § 36(2)(c) (including among types of pecuniary loss to a trademark
holder, "harm to the market reputation of the plaintiff's goods, services, business, or
trademark"). A modem variant on damages for injury to goodwill is an award which
compensates the trademark holder for necessary corrective advertising. Id. § 36(2)(d)
(including among types of pecuniary loss to a trademark holder, "reasonable expendi-
tures made by the [holder] in order to prevent, correct, or mitigate the confusion of
deception of prospective purchasers resulting from the actor's conduct"). For cases
discussing the propriety of a damage award for corrective advertising, see U-Haul
Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 1986); Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v.
Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 745 (7th Cir. 1985); Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1374-75 (10th Cir. 1977); Cuisinarts, Inc.
v. Robot-Coupe Int'l Corp., 580 F. Supp. 634, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also Restate-
ment Third, supra note 2, § 35 cmt. g ("[A] defendant will not ordinarily be required
[by injunction] to engage in corrective advertising unless the adverse effects of the
misconduct are likely to persist in the absence of such measures.").
9. In trademark, calculating a reasonable royalty typically is restricted to cases in
which the basis for a royalty rate can be found in either a prior license with the in-
fringer or prior license negotiations with the infringer. Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire
Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 919-20 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that, in the Fifth Circuit,
"damages [are] to be awarded for unauthorized trademark usage by reference to a
royalty rate under which the trademark was otherwise licensed, or by reference to a
royalty rate offered by a party, but rejected by the trademark owner prior to infringe-
ment by the party" (citations omitted)); Boston Prof l Hockey Ass'n, v. Dallas Cap &
Emblem Mfg., 597 F.2d 71, 76 (5th Cir. 1979) (basing a reasonable royalty rate on
prior negotiations); see also Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. d (explaining
that the "royalty rate normally charged for licensing the trademark use made by the
defendant.., is typically invoked in cases involving licensees who continue to use the
mark after termination of the license."); Siegrun D. Kane, Trademark Law: A Practi-
tioner's Guide 275 (1991) ("Previous negotiations between the parties or custom in
the trade can provide the basis for computing a reasonable royalty."). But see Sands,
Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1343-45, 1351 (7th Cir. 1994) (ap-
proving a reasonable royalty in a case where the parties had not previously considered
a license). Because royalty rates can vary from one license to another, some evidence
of prior dealings typically is necessary to overcome an objection that the award is
speculative. Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Gadsen Motel Co., 804 F.2d 1562, 1564-65 (11th Cir.
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law. 4 In addition, in trademark actions, courts have allowed account-
ings where the action is styled as one for the tort of unfair competi-
tion,15 and where the trademark is treated as a form of property
right.16 What has emerged is a complex set of rules and rationales1 7
that courts do not apply consistently.'"
fringement and unfair competition is historically equitable in nature."); Restatement
Third, supra note 2, § 37 cmt. b ("Accountings of profits in unfair competition cases
were initially granted as ancillary relief in actions in equity ....").
14. See generally 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 608-09 (2d ed. 1993) ("A
form of action known as Account was recognized by early common law."); see also
Ripling v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 2d 399, 403 (1952) (noting the "class of cases
founded on the old common law action of account which antedated the chancellor
and which were [sic] triable either in law or equity").
15. Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37 cmL b ("Accountings [were initially al-
lowed] in unfair competition cases.").
16. Most often, this characterization of trademark rights follows the labor theory
of value, which recognizes rights in property whenever an individual mixes labor and
improves the value of the property. See generally John Locke, The Second Treatise of
Government 16-30 (1952) (providing that "labor makes the far greatest part of the
value of things" and that an individual can obtain goods by "bestow[ing] his labor
upon it"). For a Lanham Act case that explicitly follows this characterization of prop-
erty rights, see Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103, 105
(2d Cir. 1988) (noting that the Lanham Act protects "the holder of the mark's invest-
ment in time and money."), cerL denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989); see also New Kids on
the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992) (ex-
plaining that in a suit alleging both common law infringement and Lanham Act viola-
tions, "[a] trademark is a limited property right in a particular word, phrase or
symboL").
The treatment of trademark rights as property rights is evident in the principle that
"[u]njust enrichment warranting an accounting exists when the defendant's sales
'were attributable to its infringing use' of plaintiffs trademark, and the burden of
proving this connection is on the plaintiff." Burndy Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 748
F.2d 767, 772 (2d Cir. 1984) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In Burndy, the
plaintiff and the defendant directly competed with products to which each had affixed
the certification mark of a third party, Underwriters Laboratory. Some of the defend-
ant's products did not meet the certification standard, and the plaintiff filed a lawsuit
establishing liability for unfair competition under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a). Burndy, 748 F.2d at 768-69. On appeal, the Second Circuit ad-
dressed issues pertaining to remedies and upheld the district court's denial of an
award of profits on the independent ground that the plaintiff did not own the trade-
mark, here, a certification mark, that was infringed. Id. at 771-73.
17. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. c (stating that as compared to
damages for pecuniary loss, "an accounting of the defendant's profits serves more
complex objectives," and that "[a]lthough the defendant's profits may sometimes rep-
resent an alternative measure of the plaintiff's damages, an award of profits often is
intended, not as compensation, but to prevent unjust enrichment or to insure an ade-
quate deterrent against further wrongdoing"); see also id. § 37 cmt. b ("The multiple
rationales for an award of the defendant's profits complicate analysis of the applicable
rules.... In some cases, however, it may be necessary to adjust the terms of the
accounting to reflect the specific objective sought by the award and the equities of the
particular case.").
18. For a recent survey of the rules applied to an accounting, see William G. Bar-
ber, Recovery of Profits Under the Lanham Act: Are the District Courts Doing Their
Job?, 82 Trademark Rep. 141 (1992).
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If it is important to recover the gains of trademark infringers, an
accounting of profits is not always the best way to measure those
gains. Current accounting rules allow an infringer to escape payment
for certain kinds of benefits that may flow from the unauthorized use
of the trademark. For example, an accounting allows recovery of the
infringer's profits only.19 An infringer who never turned a profit may
escape payment of damages, even if unauthorized use allowed the in-
fringer to avoid still greater financial losses. Also, an accounting ap-
plies to activity during the period of knowing infringement only.20 An
infringer who gained access to the market may escape payment of
damages, even if unauthorized use allowed the infringer to retain a
greater market presence after the period of infringement.
What is missing from the literature is an analysis that first identifies
the rationales courts have used to justify an accounting, and then de-
termines whether a different approach to measuring the gains of
trademark infringers would better serve the rationales that make
sense. This Article begins with a brief overview of the rationales that
courts have used to justify an accounting as a trademark remedy:
compensation, deterrence, and unjust enrichment. 21 Although origi-
nally thought to compensate the trademark holder for lost profits on
diverted sales,22 it no longer makes sense to justify an accounting as
compensatory.23 Recovery of the infringer's gain is instead consistent
with the rationales of deterring infringement and preventing unjust
enrichment. These rationales are not adequately served, however, be-
19. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37(1) (stating that the infringer is "lia-
ble for the net profits earned on profitable transactions.").
20. See id. § 37(1)(a) (stating that an accounting is available only if "the actor
engaged in the conduct with the intention of causing confusion or deception.").
21. Many modem opinions continue to recite a litany of all three rationales to
justify an accounting. See, e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 941
(7th Cir. 1989) ("Profits are awarded under different rationales including unjust en-
richment, deterrence, and compensation."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990); Burndy
Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 767, 772 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Normally an ac-
counting will be ordered only if the 'defendant is unjustly enriched, if the plaintiff
sustained damages from the infringement, or if an accounting is necessary to deter a
willful infringer from doing so again.' " (quoting W.E. Basset Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435
F.2d 656, 664 (2d Cir. 1970))); United States Olympic Comm. v. Union Sport Apparel,
220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 526, 530 (E.D. Va. 1983) ("An accounting of an infringer's prof-
its should be granted if the infringer is unjustly enriched, if the trademark owner sus-
tained damages from the infringement, or if an accounting is necessary as a deterrent
to future infringements.").
22. Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37 cnt. b ("An award of the defendant's
profits was traditionally justified as compensation to the plaintiff... [on] the infer-
ence that the profits earned by the defendant represented profits diverted from the
plaintiff.").
23. As is now recognized, "[tihe correspondence [between plaintiffs and defend-
ant's profits] is clearly imperfect, however, since in most cases there is no reason to
expect that every sale made by the defendant has been diverted from the plaintiff or
that the profit margins of the parties are necessarily the same." Id. § 37 cmt. b.
1914 [Vol. 65
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cause an infringer can benefit without earning profits during the pe-
riod of knowing infringement.
The discussion continues by proposing a statistical model that pro-
vides a more comprehensive approach to measuring the gains of
trademark infringement and, consequently, better serves the ratio-
nales of deterrence and unjust enrichment. Graphical depictions of
the likely life cycles of successful and unsuccessful products help to
illustrate different ways that an infringer can gain from unauthorized
use. The graphical depictions suggest a formal statistical model that
measures the difference between the infringer's revenues on the ac-
tual life cycle that includes infringement and an estimated life cycle
that does not include infringement. The proposed model is more com-
prehensive than a traditional accounting because the model measures
not only any increased revenues earned during the period of infringe-
ment, but also any additional gains from avoiding greater financial
losses or obtaining a market presence that lasts after infringement
ceases.
I. Tim- RATIONALES UNDERLYING AN ACCOUNTING OF PROFITS
The law of remedies serves a variety of rationales.24 The law of
trademark remedies is no different.25 For example, an accounting of
profits has served at least three rationales: compensation, deterrence,
and unjust enrichment.26 To determine whether the traditional limita-
tions on an accounting make sense today, this Part will first determine
which of the traditional rationales continue to make sense today.
A. The Mechanism of an Accounting
Regardless of the rationale advanced, the mechanism for an ac-
counting follows a consistent pattern that was established long ago.
The initial burden falls upon the trademark holder to show the in-
fringer's gross revenues from profitable transactions attributed to the
unauthorized use.27 Unprofitable transactions are not included, and
those losses do not offset the gains on profitable transactions.28 The
24. See generally 1 Dobbs, supra note 14, at 1-11 (providing an introductory dis-
cussion of four major categories of remedies, and rationales for each).
25. See generally 4 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 30.58 (providing an introductory dis-
cussion of factors considered in monetary remedies, and noting that the "public policy
and theoretical basis underlying [remedies] have received inadequate judicial atten-
tion and have remained confused and undefined" (citation omitted)).
26. See supra notes 17 & 21.
27. Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37 cmt. d ("The plaintiff has the burden of
proving the defendant's gross profits vith reasonable certainty, mathematical preci-
sion is not required.").
28. Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 781 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)
("Of the thirteen restaurants found to infringe .... the profits on the six restaurants
could not be offset by the losses incurred at the other seven restaurants ... ."); Re-
statement Third, supra note 2, § 37 cmt. d ("[E]ach sale is an independent wrong to
1997] 1915
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burden then shifts to the trademark infringer to show allowable de-
ductions.29 For example, the infringer can deduct production and
marketing costs30 as well as any sales that can be attributed to any
enhanced product qualities provided by the infringer.3' The result of
this accounting is a damage figure that measures, with reasonable cer-
tainty, profits attributable to the unauthorized use of the trademark.32
An accounting of the infringer's profits has become a preferred
remedy, especially after enactment of the Lanham Act. Indeed, an
accounting is the first of the specific categories of monetary relief au-
thorized by section 35(a):
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a [trade]mark...
shall have been established in any civil action arising under this
chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled .... subject to the principles of
equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained
by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action. The court shall as-
sess such profits and damages or cause the same to be assessed
under its direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required
the plaintiff. The plaintiff may thus recover the defendant's profits on profitable
transactions without a deduction for losses suffered on unprofitable transactions.").
But see Burger King, 855 F.2d at 782-83 (stating that it is not an abuse of discretion
"to offset the unprofitable years of a given restaurant against the profitable years at
that particular restaurant").
29. Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. b ("[U]pon proof of the defend-
ant's gross sales the burden shifts to the defendant to prove [deductions]."). The
shifting of the burden of proof often is justified by pointing out that any uncertainties
were created by the infringer's own activities. As one court explained:
[I]n a trademark infringement case where the trademark owner seeks to re-
cover the infringer's unjust profits, "[a]ll the inconvenience and loss from the
confusion is thrown upon the party who produces it; and this rule applies,
even though the innocent victim's share in the property wrongfully and inex-
tricably commingled may apparently be a small part of the total."
Wynn Oil Co. v. American Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595,606 (6th Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted).
30. See generally Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37 cmts. g, h (describing the
kinds of costs that are deductible and how those deductions are measured).
31. Id § 37 cmt. d ("Although a court will ordinarily infer that all sales of goods
bearing an infringing designation are attributable to the infringement, the inference
may be rebutted by evidence establishing ... that the sales resulted solely from the
inherent merits of the defendant's product without regard to its source or
sponsorship.").
32. As suggested by the requirement of "reasonable certainty" but the lack of a
requirement of "mathematical precision," id. § 37 cmt. d, the mechanism of an ac-
counting implicitly recognizes that there is room for error, at least in terms of calculat-
ing profits that resulted from infringement. For example, as just noted, the defendant
can deduct profits on a sale that was made solely because of enhanced product quali-
ties provided by the defendant. But, if a sale was "caused in part by the [infringe-
ment] and in part by other factors such as the intrinsic merit of the defendant's goods
or the convenience of purchasers [,] ... the defendant is liable for the resulting profit
without diminution for other contributing factors." Id. Thus, if a sale was partially
caused by the infringement, all of the profits on that sale are included, even if some of
those profits resulted from factors other than the infringement.
1916 [Vol. 65
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to prove defendant's sales only; defendant must prove all elements of
cost or deduction claimed 33
An accounting has not been allowed for every instance of trade-
mark infringement, although the circumstances under which an ac-
counting is available have changed over time. For example,
accountings were granted originally only where the infringer and the
trademark holder directly competed. 4 Now, accountings are avail-
able in a broader range of contexts that go beyond direct competi-
tion.35 In addition, accountings were granted originally only where
the infringer engaged in wilful or knowing infringement.36 This re-
striction remains today, although there is authority that the require-
ment of wilful infringement may be relaxed. 37 To understand why
these rules of an accounting were imposed or relaxed, it is necessary
to examine the rationales that courts have used to justify an
accounting.
B. The Use of an Accounting to Compensate
Historically, monetary relief was originally meant to compensate
the trademark holder for lost profits on diverted sales and injury to
goodwill. Early courts tended to restrict compensatory damages to
fact situations in which the infringer competed directly with the trade-
mark holder. Only in these fact situations did early courts believe that
the trademark holder could show that infringer's unauthorized use di-
verted sales from the trademark holder's customers2 s Similarly, only
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994) (emphases added). Because § 35(a) of the Lanham
Act subjects monetary relief to "the principles of equity," the enumerated remedies
are not available as a matter of right. As one court explained: -The defendant is not
entitled to an accounting to recover the plaintiff's profits. An accounting for an in-
fringer's profits is an equitable remedy. The federal statute provides that the trade-
mark owner's right to recover damages, profits and costs is 'subject to the principles
of equity.' "Borg-Warner Corp. v. York-Shipley, Inc., 293 F.2d 88, 95 (7th Cir. 1961)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)). See generally Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37
cmt. f (discussing general reasons for declining to award an accounting).
34. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37 cmt. b ("The [historical] view of an
accounting as a surrogate for plaintiff's lost profits resulted in a rule that an account-
ing was appropriate only in cases involving directly competing goods, since noncom-
peting goods could not divert sales from the plaintiff.").
35. See Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Other
than general equitable considerations, there is no express requirement that the parties
be in direct competition .... "), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990).
36. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. b ("[P]roof of an intent to
deceive is a prerequisite to an award of the defendant's profits .... ").
37. See Roulo, 886 F.2d at 941 ("Other than general equitable considerations,
there is no express requirement... that the infringer wilfuly infringe the trade dress
to justify an award of profits."); Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37 cmt. c ("An
award of defendant's profits, however, is ordinarily reserved for cases of intentional
misconduct." (emphasis added)). See generally id. § 37 cmt. e (discussing reasons for
imposing requirement of wilful infringement).
38. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37 cmt. b ("The view of an accounting
as a surrogate for plaintiffs lost profits resulted in a rule that an accounting was ap-
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in these fact situations did early courts believe that the trademark
holder could show that the infringer's unauthorized use tarnished the
trademark holder's business reputation among its customers.
Common law courts first granted accountings by reasoning that an
infringer's profits are a surrogate measure of the trademark holder's
own lost profits. This practice might be attributed to the difficulties of
proof. There are many reasons for lack of success in the marketplace,
only one of which is trademark infringement.39 Indeed, the problems
of proving, with reasonable certainty, the amount and cause of lost
profits or an injury to goodwill have long been recognized. 0 Conse-
quently, courts began looking to the infringer's success as an indirect
measure of the trademark holder's loss. 4 1 Accountings were justified
by inferring that the infringer's profits derive entirely from sales that
were diverted from the trademark holder.4 2 Even with this inference,
an accounting is not a complete measure of the trademark holder's
potential injuries; an infringer's profits bear no logical relation to
damages for injury to the trademark holder's goodwill.
Courts of equity may have first awarded accountings because of
concerns for judicial economy, but these courts also justified the re-
covery of the infringer's profits as compensatory.43 Before the merger
of law and equity, courts recognized that a trademark holder might
bring two actions, one in law for past damages and one in equity to
enjoin future infringement. 44 To avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits,
courts of equity allowed trademark holders to seek, in a single action,
propriate only in cases involving directly competing goods, since noncompeting goods
could not divert sales from the plaintiff.").
39. See id. § 36 cmt. b ("The plaintiff's sales are subject to a variety of forces,
including business cycles, shifts in consumer demand, and the legitimate marketing
strategies of competitors."). For a case in which the trademark holder did not show
that its lack of success was due to unfair competition in violation of § 43(a) rather
than the efforts of third party competitors, see Burndy Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc.,
748 F.2d 767, 769, 773 (2d Cir. 1984).
40. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. b (noting the "difficulty of
establishing the fact and extent of loss attributable to a competitor's unfair
competition").
41. Plaintiffs may have also preferred an accounting of profits because of the rela-
tive ease of satisfying the burden of proof. See id. § 36 cmt. b ("An accounting of the
defendant's profits was thus often advantageous to the trademark owner, since upon
proof of the defendant's gross sales the burden shifts to the defendant to prove Jde-
ductions]."); id. § 37 cmt. b ("[T]he accounting remedy is an attractive alternative to
plaintiffs who otherwise must bear the burden of proving the fact and amount of loss
42. See id. § 36 cmt. b ("Some courts assumed that the sales made by the defend-
ant had been diverted from the plaintiff and thus regarded the defendant's profits as a
measure of the plaintiff's damages.").
43. See iL ("The early preference for the action in equity blurred the distinction
between a recovery of the plaintiff's damages and an award of the defendant's
profits.")
44. See id. ("Prior to the merger of law and equity, a plaintiff alleging trademark
infringement... could bring an action at law for damages or an action in equity for
injunctive relief.").
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an accounting of profits as well as an injunction.4 5 Some courts al-
lowed these accountings by analogy to the established action, in eq-
uity, for an accounting of the profits of a trustee.' Just as often,
however, courts identified the purpose as compensatory and followed
the lead of common law courts by using the infringer's profits as a
surrogate measure for the trademark holder's own injury for lost
profits.47
From an economic perspective, the practice of using the infringer's
profits as a surrogate to compensate the trademark holder for lost
profits on diverted sales is, at best, suspect.' Historically, this remedy
was limited to situations in which the infringer competed with the
trademark holder. Where there is direct competition, the inference is
that the infringer made and profited from sales that, but for the diver-
sion caused by the infringement, would have yielded the same profits
for the trademark holder.49 As discussed next, a more complex chain
of inferences is necessary for this reasoning to make economic sense.
Examining the additional limitations required by the additional infer-
45. See id ("Courts of equity, in order to avoid the need for a separate action at
law, sometimes awarded damages or an accounting of the defendant's profits in addi-
tion to injunctive relief."); it § 37 cmt. b ("Accountings of profits in unfair competi-
tion cases were initially granted as ancillary relief in actions in equity, thus permitting
an award of monetary and injunctive relief in the same action.").
46. Cf 1 Dobbs, supra note 14, at 608 (explaining that an accounting "reaches
monies owed by a fiduciary or other wrongdoer, including profits produced by prop-
erty which in equity and good conscience belonged to the plaintiff").
47. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmL b ("Many courts, however, did
not recognize a sharp distinction between cases in which the plaintiff offered direct
proof of actual loss such as diverted sales or harm to reputation and cases in which the
plaintiff instead sought a recovery measured by the amount of the defendant's gain.").
48. Although this insight is not new, see id. ("[D]efendant's profits may bear only
a slight relationship to the loss sustained by the plaintiff ...... "), courts and commenta-
tors have not taken the implications so far as to reject the compensatory rationale for
an accounting of profits. In fact, even the Restatement Third continues to urge that
an award of the infringer's profits can be used to compensate the trademark holder.
Id § 36 cmt. c ("[I]n the absence of contrary evidence the court may conclude that the
defendant's profits adequately reflect the sales lost by the plaintiff."). This view is
reflected in the rule that courts may "permit[ ] ... recovery of both damages.. . and
an accounting of the defendant's profits... ,with the caveat that the plaintiff may not
recover twice for the same loss." Id. Double recovery is possible only if courts believe
that defendant's profits correspond, at least in part, to sales diverted from the
plaintiff
49. As a simple definition of competing products, this inference has a superficial
appeal:
Product forms [or brands of the same product] can also be direct competi-
tors in the sense that they serve as alternatives in satisfying the same need.
Because product forms are close substitutes, a buyer of one product form is
unlikely to be interested in a competing product form. Thus, the market
gain of one product form usually comes at the expense of another.
Sak Onkvisit & John J. Shaw, Product Life Cycles and Product Management 11
(1989). As the text explains next, the inferences are more complex than the simple
definition of competing products suggests. Id. at 11-18.
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ences discloses that an infringer's profits are rarely, if ever, a reliable
evidentiary surrogate for the trademark holder's lost profits.
Implicit in the practice of using the infringer's profits as an eviden-
tiary surrogate is the inference that each sale of an infringing product
must correspond to a lost sale of the trademarked product. Economic
theory suggests that this limitation of a one-to-one correspondence is
not likely. An infringer who enters a market with a typical, down-
ward-sloping demand curve must offer a lower price to sell the addi-
tional quantity. Consequently, the infringer's sales result not only
from existing sales diverted from the trademark holder, but also from
new sales induced by the lower price.50 Rather than a one-to-one cor-
respondence, the infringer likely will sell more products than the
trademark holder will lose.5 ' Thus, if the accounting is calculated over
all of the infringer's sales, the trademark holder's recovery is likely
calculated over a greater number of sales than those actually diverted
because of the infringement.52
Further, even if there is a one-to-one correspondence between in-
fringing and diverted sales, using the infringer's profits as an eviden-
tiary surrogate makes sense only if the infringer's profit margin is
identical to the trademark holder's profit margin on diverted sales.53
This limitation on the infringer's price-cost margin is problematic.54
Because the infringer likely will lower its price to sell the additional
quantity, the infringer's price likely will be lower than what the trade-
mark holder would have charged had the added quantity not been on
50. Again, this insight is not new. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. c
("[N]ot all of the defendant's sales may represent sales diverted from the plaintiff
... ."); id. § 37 cmt. b ("[I]n most cases there is no reason to expect that every sale
made by the defendant has been diverted from the plaintiff .... ").
51. This is a concern in an analogous context whenever a company introduces a
new product that competes with the company's existing products. The company
wants to assure that the new product will sell more than existing products will lose.
See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 33-35 (citing examples including the introduc-
tion of diet Coke; while 48% of sales were diverted from Coca-Cola's existing prod-
ucts, 52% came from new customers).
52. This bias might be offset by the future sales that the trademark holder may
lose. In markets where customers develop brand loyalty and make frequent repeat
purchases, one diverted sale may represent a diverted customer and the future
purchases of that customer. If this is the case, however, the proper measure of com-
pensatory damages is not the infringer's profits during infringement. Rather, the
proper measure would be the present value of profits that would have been made
from diverted customers.
53. Here, profit margin refers to what are commonly called "rents," that is, the
difference between price and all costs, including a reasonable payment for fixed costs
and other capitalized expenses that must be recovered over time to assure long-term
financial success. David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,
33-45 (J. M. Dent & Sons ed. 1977) (n.p. n.d.).
54. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. c ("[T]he parties may have
different profit margins .... "); id § 37 crnt. b ("[I]n most cases there is no reason to
expect that ... the profit margins of the parties are necessarily the same.").
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the market.' Moreover-and, as explained in greater detail be-
low 56 -because the infringer avoids the largely fixed costs of develop-
ing a trademark into a valuable marketing asset, the infringer's costs
that are capitalized and recovered over time likely will be lower than
those of the trademark holder. Thus, there is little reason to believe
that the infringer's price-cost margin will mirror the trademark
holder's profits on lost sales.57
Finally, using the infringer's profits to measure the trademark
holder's lost profits implies that the trademark holder did not lose
profits on sales that were not diverted. This limitation on the trade-
mark holder's continuing price-cost margin is most problematic.
Faced with the infringer's additional quantity and lower price, the
trademark holder likely will lower the price of the trademarked prod-
uct.58 If the trademark holder continues to sell the same quantity,
gross revenues will decrease while costs stay the same, resulting in
lower profits on sales that were not diverted. But, the infringer's addi-
tional quantity likely will divert some sales and lower the trademark
holder's quantity. If the trademark holder has more than insignificant
fixed costs, the lower quantity translates into higher average total
costs which, in turn, further lower profits on sales that were not di-
verted. Here, there is little reason to believe that the trademark
holder will not lose profits on sales that were not diverted.
The award of an accounting for compensatory purposes makes even
less sense if the infringer does not directly compete with the trade-
mark holder.59 The test of liability for trademark infringement-"a
likelihood of confusion"-is not limited to contexts in which the in-
fringer and trademark holder directly compete.60 For example, in-
55. I& § 36 cmt d ("[D]efendant's wrongful conduct may sometimes compel the
plaintiff to sell its goods at a lower price.").
56. See infra text accompanying notes 137-38 & 173-74.
57. Of course, there is the possibility that the infringer's price will be less than the
trademark holder's price by exactly the same amount that the infringer's costs are less
than the trademark holder's costs. While theoretically possible, there is little reason
to believe that this relation will, in fact, result. Indeed, different market forces deter-
mine the price that consumers will pay and the costs that producers will incur. See
Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 76-82 (explaining that marketers cannot control
consumer variables but can influence and promote product characteristics.).
58. This likelihood is explicitly noted by the Restatement Third, which includes
among the types of pecuniary loss to the trademark holder, "loss resulting from sales
made by the plaintiff at prices that have been reasonably reduced because of the ac-
tor's conduct." Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36(2)(b).
59. Perhaps this is why modem courts continuing to justify an accounting of prof-
its as compensatory tend to restrict the accounting to transactions that were made in
direct competition with the trademark holder. Minnesota Pet-Breeders, Inc. v. Schell
& Kampeter, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 506, 514 (D. Minn. 1993) ("[Any award of profits
under the theories of unjust enrichment, deterrence or sustained damages (compensa-
tion) [are limited] to those profits resulting from sales in the geographical area of
plaintiff's actual product market penetration." (quotation omitted)).
60. A case commonly cited for its listing of the factors relevant to a determination
of a likelihood of confusion includes in its list two factors which apply only if the
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fringement can be found if the infringer operates in a separate product
market or geographic market that is within the natural zone of expan-
sion for the trademark holder.6' Or, infringement can be found if the
infringer operates in a separate market that is sufficiently proximate
to the trademark holder's market.62 Provided that the use of a confus-
ingly similar brandname on the infringing product is likely to lead con-
sumers to believe that the infringing product comes from the same
source as the trademarked product, it matters not whether the two
products directly compete.63
Where the infringer and trademark holder do not directly compete,
it makes no economic sense to justify monetary relief as compensating
the trademark holder for lost profits on diverted sales.64 If the infring-
ing product is a complementary good whose purchase and use en-
hances the value of the trademarked product, the added competition
in the market for the complementary good may actually benefit the
trademark holder. The added competition likely will lower the price
of the complementary good which, in turn, will lower the overall price
that consumers pay for a package that includes both the complemen-
tary good and the trademarked product.65 This will increase demand
for the trademarked product, even if the price of the trademarked
product does not change. If, however, the infringing product is
neither a substitute good that competes with, nor a complementary
good that enhances, the trademark holder's product, there is no rea-
son to believe that the trademark holder will lose sales, much less
profits.
infringer and the trademark holder are not directly competing: "the proximity of the
products" and "the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap." Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp, 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820
(1961); see also 3 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 27.32 ("With the possible exception of the
Ninth Circuit, the courts have held that the plaintiff and the defendant need not be in
direct competition with each other for the plaintiff to have standing to sue for injunc-
tive relief under § 43(a).").
61. Cf. Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 35 cmt. c ("In determining the appro-
priate scope of injunctive relief, the court may also consider the extent to which the
plaintiff has invested in planned expansion under the mark into other products or
other geographic markets.").
62. Cf. id. § 35 cmt. f ("[C]ourts may give relatively broader geographic protection
when there is substantial similarity between the products and marketing methods of
the plaintiff and the defendant.").
63. See supra note 35.
64. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. c.
An award of the defendant's profits in a case involving noncompeting prod-
ucts cannot reflect diverted sales; the purpose of the award ordinarily is to
deprive the defendant of unjust enrichment and to deter future misconduct.
In such circumstances the defendant's profits are awarded to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the fact that they do not directly reflect any harm caused by
the infringement or deceptive marketing.
Id.
65. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 6-8 (stating that one competitive strat-
egy is to bundle different products together and sell as a unit).
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While compensating the trademark holder for lost profits on di-
verted sales and injury to goodwill is an important rationale for some
trademark remedies, recovery of the infringer's profits is not geared to
serve that rationale. To begin, the infringer's profits bear no logical
relation to an injury to the trademark holder's goodwill regardless of
whether the infringer and the trademark holder directly compete. In
addition, an infringer's profits bear no logical relation to the trade-
mark holder's lost profits on diverted sales if the infringer and the
trademark holder do not directly compete. The only possibility for an
accounting to serve a compensatory rationale is as a measure of the
trademark holder's lost profits on diverted sales where the infringer
and the trademark holder directly compete.
Even where the infringer and the trademark holder directly com-
pete, it makes economic sense to use an accounting as a surrogate
measure of the trademark holder's lost profits on diverted sales in lim-
ited contexts that rarely, if ever, make economic sense. 66 The in-
fringer must not only compete directly with the trademark holder, but
there must also be a one-to-one correspondence of infringing sales to
lost sales, an identity of profit margins on those sales, and no lost prof-
its on the trademark holder's continuing sales. Economic theory
teaches that such a limited context is not likely to be found. Conse-
quently, to justify the recovery of an infringer's profits, a rationale
other than compensating the trademark holder must be found.
A more fundamental point to be drawn from this discussion is that
any remedy designed to recover the gains of infringers will not likely
serve a compensatory rationale.67 Any injury to the trademark holder
is logically and factually distinct from the gains of trademark infringe-
ment. A compensatory rationale is directed towards remedying inju-
66. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37 cmt. b ("[/in most cases there is no
reason to expect that every sale made by the defendant has been diverted from the
plaintiff or that the profit margins of the parties are necessarily the same." (emphasis
added)).
67. This much can be drawn from the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Sands, Taylor &
Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340 (7th Cir. 1994). There, the district court
initially awarded 10% of the infringer's profits as an estimate of the trademark
holder's actual loss. The Seventh Circuit thought this approach "methodologically
flawed," id at 1350, and its reasoning discloses that an award of the infringer's gains
does not serve a compensatory rationale:
Based solely on an estimation of the amount of profits attributable to the
illegality, such an award was not the most accurate possible reflection of the
actual loss incurred by STW [the trademark holder]. We therefore required
the district court to undertake a reassessment of its award that would require
it to address more precisely the actual loss of STNW. Accordingly, we held
that the district court ought to begin with the one measure of actual damages
that, if ascertained with reasonable certainty, could be said to reflect the
actual loss of STW-the cost of a reasonable royalty.
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ries to the trademark holder.6 s There is little reason to believe,
however, that the monetary damages suffered by the trademark
holder will inexorably mirror the gains of the infringer. Consequently,
to justify a remedy that recovers the gains of trademark infringement,
a rationale other than compensating the trademark holder must be
found.
C. Expanding the Rationales for an Accounting
The development of alternative rationales for trademark remedies
did not begin with a modem understanding that the infringer's profits
are not likely to indicate the trademark holder's own injury for lost
profits on diverted sales. Wholly apart from the economic critique of
using an accounting for compensation, courts have justified account-
ings to deter trademark infringement and to prevent unjust enrich-
ment. Sometimes, these rationales are characterized as post-Lanham
Act developments.69 The intellectual foundations for the deterrence
and unjust enrichment rationales, however, were laid much earlier.70
Those foundations help to explain the rules of an accounting that re-
main today.
The rationales of deterrence and unjust enrichment seem implicit in
the analogies that courts have drawn to other areas of law when dis-
cussing trademark infringement. Trademark law did not evolve from
a single source. Trademark infringement can trace its lineage to tort
68. Cf. Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1157 (7th Cir. 1994)(holding that a monetary award based either on the loss of the plaintiff or the benefit
to the defendant and "plaintiff's provable damages are the benchmark for . . .
compensation.").
69. See Koelemay, supra note 1, at 487. In Koelemay's words:
Since the enactment of Section 35 in 1946, the law of monetary recovery has
seen two major developments. First, the courts have enunciated two new
rationales for awards of monetary relief, in addition to the traditional goal of
compensating the trademark owner: prevention of unjust enrichment, and
deterrence of future infringement.
Id.
70. According to the Restatement Third, the application of these rationales to jus-
tify an accounting of profits was prompted by the extension of trademark liability to
noncompeting goods:
[D]eliberate infringement on noncompeting goods may not be sufficiently
deterred if the plaintiff s inability to prove damages leaves an injunction as
the only available remedy. Thus, courts gradually adopted the view that in
an appropriate case an accounting of the defendant's profits could be
awarded to prevent unjust enrichment and to deter future infringement.
This perspective emphasizes the gains earned by the defendant rather than
the losses incurred by the plaintiff.
Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37 cmt. b.
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law7' and, in particular, to actions for unfair competition.' In unfair
competition, the focus of liability is upon wrongful conduct that in-
jures the consuming public, and remedies that deter wrongful conduct
are appropriate. In addition, trademark rights have historically been
characterized as a kind of property right.7 3 In property, the focus of
liability is upon the unauthorized use of the owner's exclusive rights.
There, remedies that recover the benefits of unauthorized use are
appropriate.
The analogies to tort and property, and the corresponding deter-
rence and unjust enrichment rationales, suggest different implications
for an accounting, but those implications are often intertwined and
difficult to separate. One reason is that modern courts typically apply
both rationales simultaneously and without distinguishing the separate
implications.74 Another is that both rationales suggest the same rules
of an accounting, although for different reasons. When courts inter-
pret or apply those rules, courts do not always distinguish the ration-
ale that suggests a particular interpretation or application.15 To
appreciate the rationales that are served by an accounting, it is useful
to try to separate the different implications of those rationales for cur-
rent accounting rules.
71. This conceptual analogy is evident in the inclusion of trademark law in the first
Restatement of Torts, see Restatement of Torts §§ 711-56 (1938), and the many refer-
ences to tort law that are found in the discussion of trademark law in the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition. See, e.g., Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 35 cmt. a
("The general rules relating to injunctive relief stated in Restatement, Second, Torts,
Chapter 48, apply in actions for unfair competition."); id. § 36 cmt. a ("The general
rules relating to the recovery of compensatory damages in tort actions apply in actions
for unfair competition.").
72. This historical origin is recognized today by the inclusion of the law of trade-
marks in the Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition. Restatement Third,
supra note 2, §§ 9-37.
73. See supra note 16.
74. For example, both the unfair competition and property analogies are present
in the following summary of Lanham Act policies:
The purposes underlying the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 are to protect
the public so it may buy a product bearing a particular trademark with confi-
dence that it will get the product it wants and to protect the holder of the
mark's investment in time and money from its misappropriation by pirates
and cheats.
Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 1988)
(emphasis added), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989).
75. An example can be found in a case involving a trademark protected by the
Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-606, 92 Stat. 3045, where the court im-
plicitly referred to both property and unfair competition when justifying an account-
ing because the infringer's conduct was intentional. United States Olympic Comm. v.
Union Sport Apparel, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 526, 530 (E.D. Va. 1983) ("Where the
infringement is deliberate and willful, even if the products are non-competitive, both
the trademark owner and the buying public are slighted, if the court provides no
greater remedy than an injunction." (emphasis added)).
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1. Deterrence
In tort actions, the need to provide deterrence shifts the focus of
monetary remedies from the victim's injuries to the tortfeasor's
wrongful conduct. Compensation is provided by way of actual dam-
ages that measure the harm to the victim. Deterrence is provided by
way of punitive or exemplary damages that provide a warning not to
engage in tortious conduct. Exemplary damages are not awarded as a
matter of right to the victim. Rather, exemplary damages are awarded
in the public interest and to set an example that deters. The decision
to award exemplary damages and the amount of the award are deter-
mined by examining the tortfeasor's conduct. Exemplary damages are
reserved for egregious conduct, evidenced by the tortfeasor's wrongful
intent.76 The amount of exemplary damages is geared to provide the
necessary incentives to deter that kind of wrongful conduct.
Not surprisingly, courts have used the deterrence rationale to justify
the recovery of a trademark infringer's profits: An accounting re-
quires the same shift of focus as an award of exemplary damages in
tort. In trademark, compensation is provided by way of other reme-
dies that measure directly the trademark holder's lost profits on di-
verted sales, injury to goodwill, or lost royalty revenues. Deterrence
in trademark is provided by way of an accounting that makes infringe-
ment unprofitable." Accountings are not awarded as a matter of
right. They may be denied if, for example, an injunction is sufficient
to halt further unauthorized use. 78 The decision to award an account-
ing and the amount of the award are determined by examining the
infringer's conduct. Accountings are reserved for instances of wilful
76. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. n (stating that the purpose of
punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer for egregious conduct and that normally
proof of malice or wilful misconduct is required).
77. Numerous courts have recognized that deterrence is achieved by making in-
fringement unprofitable. See, e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 941
(7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the trial court's primary function is to ensure that violat-
ing the Lanham Act is unprofitable), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075, (1990); Louis Vuitton
S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 1989) (awarding treble damages for using the
plaintiffs trademark); Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738,
744 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding a trial court's award of 15% of the defendant's sales);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., Inc., 692 F.2d 1272, 1274-1275 (9th Cir.
1982) (discussing the importance of deterrence in general); Masterpiece of Pa., Inc. v.
Consolidated Novelty Co., Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 134, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[T]he
only way the courts can fashion a strong enough deterrence is to see to it that a com-
pany found guilty of willful infringement shall lose all its profits from its use of the
infringing mark." (quoting W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon Co., 435 F.2d 656, 664 (2d Cir.
1970))). If a trademark owner proceeds in common law but not under the Lanham
Act, punitive damages may be awarded to achieve deterrence. See U-Haul Int'l, Inc.
v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting, but not reviewing, award
of punitive damages on common law cause of action).
78. For an early case in which an injunction was granted but an accounting denied,
see N.K. Fairbank Co. v. Luckel, King & Cake Soap Co., 116 F. 332 (9th Cir. 1902).
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infringement.79 The amount is measured by the profits earned during
the period of knowing infringement.
The use of a deterrence rationale by analogy to exemplary damages
in tort has become problematic because of troublesome language in
the Lanham Act. 0 Section 35(a) provides that damages "shall consti-
tute compensation and not a penalty."'" But, the same section also
authorizes a trebling of compensatory damages, attorneys' fees in ex-
ceptional cases, and the enhancement of an award based upon the in-
fringer's profits!'r Some courts have resolved this conflict by arguing
that these measures are necessary to compensate the trademark
holder when damages are difficult to prove.8s This argument is defi-
cient when applied to an accounting of profits because, properly un-
derstood, an award of an infringer's profits is not compensatory.
Thus, the requirement that damages must compensate conflicts with
79. Another reason for the requirement of willful infringement is that courts, rec-
ognizing that an accounting may not approximate damages and perhaps overcompen-
sate the trademark holder, reserved an accounting for egregious instances of
infringement. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. b (explaining that an
accounting can produce "a potential windfall" to the plaintiff, and was therefore "gen-
erally reserved for cases of wilful infringement").
80. Courts and commentators have recognized that § 35 contains "problematic"
and "troublesome" language. See e.g., Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, 979 F.2d 499, 507
(7th Cir. 1992) ("Punitive damages are problematic because the Lanham Act,
although providing for the trebling of compensatory damages, forbids other penal-
ties."); Ralph S. Brown, Civil Remedies for Intellectual Property Invasions: Themes
and Variations, 55 Law & Contemp. Probs. 45,74-76 (1992). Of course, if a trademark
holder pursues a common law cause of action for unfair competition, there is no statu-
tory impediment to an award of punitive damages to achieve deterrence. See Restate-
ment Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. n ("A successful plaintiff in an action for unfair
competition may recover punitive damages under the rules generally applicable to
awards of punitive damages in tort actions.").
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994).
82. One court has pointed out, rather bluntly, the illogic of authorizing the treb-
ling or enhancing of compensatory damages but, at the same time, forbidding penal-
ties: "It is anomalous to say that an enhancement of damages, which implies an award
exceeding the amount found 'compensatory,' must be 'compensatory' and not 'puni-
tive.' "Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1127 (5th Cir. 1991).
affd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
83. Id. ("[E]nhancement could, consistent with the 'principles of equity' promoted
in section 35, provide proper redress to an otherwise undercompensated plaintiff
where imprecise damage calculations fail to do justice, particularly where the impreci-
sion results from defendant's conduct."); ALPO PetFoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.,
913 F.2d 958, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("This provision gives the court discretion to en-
hance damages, as long as the ultimate award qualifies as 'compensation and not [as]
a penalty.' "); see also Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1351
(7th Cir. 1994) ("Enhancement of the damages attributable to a lost royalty in order
to ensure that the malefactor, and not the victim, bears the burden of any uncertainty
in its calculation is a permissible way of achieving [compensation]."); Boston Profes-
sional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 597 F.2d 71, 77 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("[W]e might agree that increased damages may be justified by defendant's
withholding or misrepresenting available sales records, which would have the effect of
making much more difficult, if not impossible, plaintiffs' proof of damages or
profits.").
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an award of the infringer's profits, and the prohibition against a pen-
alty conflicts with an enhancement of an award of those profits.
The better explanation is provided by courts that resolve the ten-
sion in the statutory language by arguing that Lanham Act remedies,
like tort remedies in general, should protect the public interest and
deter future misconduct.14 Courts following this view caution, for ex-
ample, that "monetary relief. .. must be great enough to [deter] in-
fringement but must not be so large as to constitute a penalty."85 An
accounting seems well suited to strike this balance. By depriving in-
fringers of the profits of unauthorized use, an accounting makes in-
fringement unprofitable and takes away any incentive to infringe.86
Moreover, by limiting an accounting to the gains of unauthorized use,
the award leaves the infringer no worse off than if the infringer had
not infringed in the first place.
Deterrence is now an accepted rationale for an accounting of a
trademark infringer's profits, 7 and that rationale implies its own con-
straints for monetary relief. For example, whereas remedies that com-
pensate the trademark holder for lost profits on diverted sales are
needed only where there is direct competition, remedies that provide
deterrence are needed wherever an infringer engages in wrongful con-
84. See Sands, 34 F.3d at 1351 ("[1In some circumstances, an enhancement might
be necessary to ensure that the victim will not once again experience a second loss at
the hands of the malefactor.").
85. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Flmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir.
1985). This certainly is the prevailing argument in the Seventh Circuit, see Sands, 34
F.3d at 1346-51 (reviewing caselaw), although the Seventh Circuit still seems to cling
to the view that enhancement may serve a compensatory rationale. Id. at 1349-50
("[E]nhancement of an award under this section as a method by which a fair recovery
might be approximated when damages and profits are not easily ascertainable.").
86. See supra note 77.
87. United States Olympic Comm. v. Union Sport Apparel, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
526, 530 (E.D. Va. 1983) ("An accounting of profits should be awarded as a deterrent
against future infringements."); Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37 cmt. f ("[T]he
need for an effective deterrent also remain[s] important in determining whether an
accounting is appropriate."). The general acceptance of the deterrence rationale for
an accounting of profits is indicated by the preference of an accounting to an award of
a reasonable royalty. A reasonable royalty is a compensatory remedy designed to
measure the revenues that the trademark holder lost because the infringer failed to
obtain a license and to pay a royalty. An accounting, however, is better suited for
deterrence. Awarding a reasonable royalty, which should have been paid anyway,
leaves the infringer in the same position as had the infringer obtained a license and
may even allow the infringer to retain some profits and thereby gain from unauthor-
ized use. Sands, 34 F.3d at 1351 ("There is no incentive to engage in protracted, ex-
pensive, and perhaps unsuccessful licensing negotiations when the consequence of
getting caught for trade piracy is simply to pay what should have been paid earlier.");
see also Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. d ("[D]amages measured by a
reasonable royalty rate provide little disincentive against infringement since they
leave the infringer no worse off than one who properly obtains a license. .. ."). An
accounting, which deprives the infringer of all profits, is better suited to deter unau-
thorized use by providing incentives either to avoid infringement or to obtain a li-
cense. See Sands, 34 F.3d at 1350 ("When profits are the appropriate measure of
damages.... the deterrence objective of the [Lanham] Act has been satisfied.").
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duct.8 Deterrence focuses, not upon any injury to the trademark
holder, but upon the wrongful conduct of the infringer. Thus, an ac-
counting need not be limited to fact situations in which the infringer
deprives the trademark holder of the benefits of using the trademark
in the trademark holder's own market. Rather, an accounting be-
comes a potential remedy to address wrongful conduct in any context
and regardless of any injury to the trademark holder.s9
The deterrence rationale also implies constraints that mirror both
the rules of an accounting and the circumstances in which exemplary
damages are awarded in tort.90 For example, exemplary damages are
typically allowed where the tortfeasor intended the wrongful con-
duct.9 Similarly, accountings are typically allowed where the in-
fringer wilfully infringed.92 The inference in both situations is that the
prospect of monetary relief will not deter innocent conduct, even if
ultimately determined illegal.93 Consistently with this view of deter-
88. This approach seems implicit in the basic orientation now taken by the Re-
statement Third: "An accounting of profits measures and transfers to the plaintiff the
gains resulting to the defendant from the wrongful conduct." Restatement Third,
supra note 2, § 37 cmt. a.
89. Indeed, one court has gone so far as to base an award of profits on the need to
deter wilful infringement, even though neither the public's interests in promoting fair
competition nor the need to prevent unjust enrichment were present:
Although we have seen no evidence that the defendant has been unjustly
enriched specifically by the use of [the infringing brandname,] and no evi-
dence that the public has suffered confusion, an accounting and award of
defendant's profits from the sale of the infringing article will be granted "to
deter a willful infringer from doing so again."
Masterpiece of Pa., Inc. v. Consolidated Novelty Co., Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 134,
137 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (quoting W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon Co., 435 F.2d 656, 664 (2d
Cir. 1970)); see also Web Printing Controls Co., Inc v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202,
1205 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that recovery of profits under § 35(a) "flow not from the
plaintiff's proof of its injury or damage, but from its proof of the defendant's unjust
enrichment or the need for deterrence."); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d
931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[Ain award of profits was appropriate under either a deter-
rence or unjust enrichment theory even if plaintiff's actual sustained losses may have
been less."), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990).
90. See generally 1 Dobbs, supra note 14, at 455. As Dobbs explains:
Punitive damages are sums awarded in addition to any compensatory or
nominal damages, usually as a punishment levied against a defendant found
guilty of particularly aggravated misconduct, coupled with a malicious, reck-
less or otherwise wrongful state of mind. Sometimes those damages are
called exemplary damages in reference to the idea that they make an exam-
ple of the defendant.
Id. (citations omitted).
91. See id at 468 ("Punitive damages are awarded when the defendant is guilty of
both a bad state of mind and highly serious misconduct.").
92. In fact, the intent of the infringer is a factor that is considered when determin-
ing whether an award for compensatory purposes is appropriate. See Restatement
Third, supra note 2, § 36(3)(c) (stating that the appropriateness of "damages for pecu-
niary loss" depends upon factors which include "the intent of the actor and the extent
to which the actor knew or should have known that the conduct was unlawful.").
93. In the economics literature, it has long been recognized that, for deterrence to
work, a potential wrongdoer must know of the potential remedy and account for that
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rence, courts limit an accounting to the period of knowing infringe-
ment.94 The accounting period begins when the infringer becomes
aware, or should have become aware, of the rights of the trademark
holder and the need for deterrence arises. The accounting period
ends when infringement and the need for deterrence ceases.
The deterrence rationale implies another constraint that mirrors
both a factor that is used to calculate exemplary damages in tort and
one of the rules of an accounting. One factor that affects the amount
of exemplary damages in tort is the wealth of the tortfeasor.95 A
smaller award is thought sufficient to deter a tortfeasor with less
wealth. Similarly, an accounting looks only to profitable transactions
in which, by analogy, the infringer obtains wealth. Losses on unprofit-
able transactions are arguably sufficient to deter infringement. Con-
sistent with this view of deterrence, courts limit an accounting to only
profitable transactions. The accounting does not include unprofitable
transactions, which market forces are thought to deter.96 Moreover,
and seemingly to assure adequate deterrence on profitable transac-
remedy in its profit-maximizing calculus. Cf. Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37
cmt. b ("The deterrence justification also suggests that an award of profits is inappro-
priate in cases of innocent infringement."). Courts recognize as much when they note
that, for deterrence to work for trademark infringers, remedies must deprive the in-
fringer of all profit. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., Inc., 692 F.2d 1272,
1274-75 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The judicial penalties imposed under such an approach
would be simply factored into the infringer's profit and loss statement. If after de-
ducting this 'judicial expense' the entrepreneur still earns a suitable return on his
investment he will continue the infringing activities."); see also Burndy Corp. v.
Teledyne Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[W]ith the absence of any
willful false representations on [the infringer's] part, which is a relevant factor, no
need for deterrence is shown." (citation omitted)).
94. In addition, the infringer's wilfulness is used to justify other remedies that
serve the deterrence rationale. Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc.,
874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1989) ("These provisions [treble damages, attorney's fees,
and prejudgment interest under § 35(a)] are properly invoked when, as in this case,
the infringement is deliberate.").
Technically, however, there is nothing in the § 35(a) authorization of remedies or,
for that matter, common law precedent, that mandates a finding of wilfulness to jus-
tify an accounting. See Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir.
1989) ("Other than general equitable considerations, there is no express requirement
... that the infringer wilfully infringe the trade dress to justify an award of profits.").
Rather, the requirement seems to flow from equitable considerations and inferences
from the logic of deterrence.
95. See 1 Dobbs, supra note 14, at 485-86 (cautioning that the theory behind puni-
tive damages is that "the trier must know something about the defendant's financial
condition in order to inflict a liability [of punitive damages] that will have an a ppro-
priate sting, and proof may show either a wealthy defendant or a poor one" (foot-
notes omitted)).
96. Of course, to the extent the infringer can benefit from unauthorized use on
unprofitable transactions, the infringer is not deterred. This aspect of an accounting
actually provides incentives to infringe. See infra text accompanying notes 228, 233,
236-38, 240.
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tions, losses on unprofitable transactions may not offset the gains on
profitable transactions.97
2. Unjust Enrichment
The rationale of preventing unjust enrichment in trademark
originates from characterizations of trademark rights as a kind of
property right.98 Certainly, the rationale of unjust enrichment is not
restricted to disputes over property rights.99 Where property rights
are at issue, however, principles of unjust enrichment dictate that the
defendant should disgorge any gains that would be unjust to retain.
This remedy is not compensatory because a defendant may be re-
quired to disgorge gains that go beyond any injury to the plaintiff for
the loss of exclusive rights to the property." ° Rather, the rationale of
preventing unjust enrichment shifts the focus of monetary remedies
from the plaintiff's injuries to the character of the defendant's unau-
thorized use. Where an accounting was allowed for the profits of the
trustee, for example, the unjust character of retaining the gains from
an unauthorized use of the beneficiary's property was established be-
cause the trustee breached a fiduciary duty. 1 1
Here as well, courts have not surprisingly used the unjust enrich-
ment rationale to justify recovery of a trademark infringer's profits:
An accounting requires the same shift of focus as an award of unjust
enrichments. In trademark, compensation is provided by other reme-
dies that directly measure the trademark holder's lost revenues on di-
verted sales, injury to good will, or lost royalty revenues. Unjust
enrichment in trademark is prevented by the remedy that requires the
infringer to disgorge profits that would be unjust to retain. Not every
unauthorized use of a trademark, however, results in gains that are
deemed unjust. Whether the infringer is unjustly enriched is deter-
mined by examining the infringer's conduct. Where the infringer
97. Of course, to the extent the infringer can benefit from unauthorized use on
unprofitable transactions, market forces do not deter those transactions, and this limi-
tation on an accounting actually provides incentives to infringe.
98. See supra note 16. Of course, one can find judicial statements to the effect
that, because the primary purpose of the Lanham Act is consumer protection, a prop-
erty analogy in inapposite. See Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d
1340, 1355 (7th Cir. 1994) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[R]estitution, a property based measure of damages, is inconsistent with the nature
of a trademark holder's rights." (emphasis omitted)). Even if this restrictive view of
the Lanham Act is accepted, it does not thereby apply to trademark actions that pro-
ceed under the common law or state antidilution statutes.
99. See 1 Dobbs, supra note 14, at 552-54 (summarizing the contexts in which the
principles of unjust enrichment applied through the remedy of restitution).
100. Indeed, in trademark infringement, an unjust enrichment rationale may justify
damages that go beyond any amount needed to compensate the trademark holder.
Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[A]n award of profits
was appropriate under... unjust enrichment theory even if plaintiff's actual sustained
losses may have been less.").
101. See supra note 46.
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wilfully infringes, the gains of trademark infringement are deemed un-
just and an accounting is warranted.
Unjust enrichment is now an accepted rationale for an accounting
of the infringer's profits,'0 2 and that rationale implies its own con-
straints for monetary relief. For example, whereas remedies that com-
pensate the trademark holder for lost profits on diverted sales are
needed only where there is direct competition, remedies that prevent
unjust enrichment are needed wherever it would be unjust for the in-
fringer to retain the gains of unauthorized use. Unjust enrichment
focuses, not upon any injury to the trademark holder, but upon the
character of the gains of the infringer. 103 Thus, an accounting need
not be limited to fact situations in which the infringer deprives the
trademark holder of the benefits of using the trademark in its own
market.10 4 Rather, an accounting becomes a potential remedy to de-
prive an infringer of the unjust gains of unauthorized use in any con-
text, regardless of any injury to the trademark holder. 10 5
The unjust enrichment rationale also implies constraints that mirror
both the characterization of enrichments as unjust and the rules of an
accounting. For example, in unjust enrichment, the character of the
defendant's conduct determines whether it is unjust for the defendant
to retain the enrichments.' 6 Similarly, in trademark infringement, the
character of the infringer's conduct determines whether it is unjust for
the infringer to retain the gains of infringement. Accountings are typ-
ically allowed where the infringer wilfully infringed. The inference is
that whereas an innocent infringer does not retain gains unjustly, an
102. Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 37 cmt. f ("The extent to which the defend-
ant would otherwise be unjustly enriched . . . remain[s] important in determining
whether an accounting is appropriate.").
103. Indeed, at least one court has noted that a reasonable royalty, which is a com-
pensatory remedy, is not well suited to deprive the infringer of unjust enrichments.
Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1350 (7th Cir. 1994)("[R]oyalty payments pose difficult problems with respect to the need to ensure that
the defendant has been divested of its ill-gotten gain.").
104. Nonetheless, some courts continue to justify accountings in terms of the unjust
enrichments that flow from diverted sales. See Burndy Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc.,
748 F.2d 767, 772 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that accounting "appears to have been limited
to situations in which the defendant's profits represent unjust enrichment derived
from diversion of business that clearly would otherwise have gone to the plaintiff.").
105. See Web Printing Controls Co. v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir.
1990) (noting that recovery of profits under § 35(a) "flow not from the plaintiff's
proof of its injury or damage, but from its proof of the defendant's unjust enrichment
or the need for deterrence."); ALPO PetFoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d
958, 968 (D.C. 1990) ("The unjust-enrichment theory, which emerged in trademark
cases in which the infringer and the infringed were not competitors, holds that courts
should divest an infringer of his profits, regardless of whether the infringer's actions
have harmed the owner of the infringed trademark.").
106. See 1 Dobbs, supra note 14, at 557-62. ("The fundamental substantive basis for
restitution is that the defendant has been unjustly enriched by receiving something,
tangible or intangible, that properly belongs to the plaintiff. Restitution rectifies un-just enrichment by forcing restoration to the plaintiff.").
1932 [Vol. 65
TRADEMARK GAINS
intentional infringer does.' 0 7 Consistent with this view of unjust en-
richment, courts limit an accounting to the period of knowing infringe-
ment. The accounting period begins when the infringer becomes
aware, or should have become aware, of the rights of the trademark
holder and the retention of any gains become unjust. The accounting
period ends when infringement and the unjust character of the in-
fringer's conduct ceases.
The unjust enrichment rationale implies another constraint that
mirrors both a characteristic of the rules of an accounting and a char-
acteristic of unjust enrichment. The rationale of preventing unjust en-
richment is implicated only if the defendant gained from the
unauthorized use. 08 Similarly, an accounting looks only to profitable
transactions. Indeed, at first glance it seems intuitive that an infringer
is not enriched if the infringer suffers a loss by incurring costs without
recovering a profit. Consistent with these views of unjust enrichment,
courts limit an accounting to profitable transactions. The accounting
does not include unprofitable transactions from which the infringer is
not thought to be enriched."° Moreover, losses on unprofitable trans-
actions may not offset the enrichments from profitable transactions.
The deterrence and unjust enrichment rationales seemingly have
led to the same constraints for an accounting, albeit for different rea-
sons. An accounting is not restricted to contexts in which the infringer
and the trademark holder directly compete. The need to deter wrong-
ful conduct or to prevent unjust enrichment is not gauged by injuries
to the trademark holder or restricted to contexts in which the trade-
mark holder suffers lost profits on diverted sales. In addition, an ac-
counting is limited to the period of knowing infringement because
monetary relief will not deter innocent infringement and because an
innocent infringer does not unjustly retain gains. An accounting is
also limited to profitable transactions arguably because market forces
already deter unprofitable transactions and because an infringer is not
enriched by unprofitable transactions.
107. See Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 781 (11th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) ("Nor is an award of profits based on either unjust enrichment or deterrence
dependent upon a higher showing of culpability [than knowing and deliberate use of
another's trademark] on the part of the defendant, who is purposely using the trade-
mark."); United States Olympic Comm. v. Union Sport Apparel, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
526, 530 (E.D. Va. 1983) ("Defendants were unjustly enriched by their acts which
deliberately appropriated to themselves plaintiff's goodwill.").
108. See supra note 106.
109. Of course, to the extent the infringer can benefit from unauthorized use on
unprofitable transactions, the infringer is enriched, and this approach to an account-
ing actually provides incentives to infringe. See infra text accompanying notes 228,
233, 236-38, 240.
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D. The Shortcomings of Current Remedies
After the merger of law and equity, theoretical analogies became of
less importance as courts expanded the use of an accounting.
Whether trademark rights are characterized by analogy to tort or
property seems of less concern today.110 The deterrence" and unjust
enrichment rationales are now accepted as trademark law principles in
their own right," 2 and modem courts readily use those rationales to
justify an accounting of profits to measure the gains of trademark in-
fringement.1 3 Following these rationales, an accounting no longer is
limited to fact situations in which the infringer competes directly with
the trademark holder. Today, a likelihood of confusion establishes lia-
bility, and profitable transactions during the period of knowing in-
fringement opens the door to an accounting of the infringer's
profits." 4
Courts have expressed concerns, however, that the current structure
of trademark remedies may not adequately serve the rationales of de-
terrence and unjust enrichment." 5 Courts have explicitly voiced this
concern with respect to deterrence. For example, one court has noted
110. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 35 cmt. a ("With the merger of law and
equity, courts are now generally free to select the remedy or combination of remedies
that most effectively protects the interests threatened by the defendant's
misconduct.").
111. Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1348 (7th Cir. 1994)
("Our circuit has recognized that the need for deterrence is an important dimension
of section 35(a).").
112. In fact, the deterrence rationale is used as a guiding principle with regard to
other trademark remedies. Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947,
963 n.19 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[I]n determining the appropriate award [based on a reason-
able royalty], the court may take into account the possible need for deterrence ......
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1042 (1993).
113. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 781 (11th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) ("An accounting for profits [makes] infringement unprofitable, and is justi-
fied because it deprives the defendant of unjust enrichment and provides a deterrent
to similar activity in the future."(citations omitted)); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling
Co., Inc., 613 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1980) ("This accounting serves two purposes:
remedying unjust enrichment and deterring future infringement."). Some courts con-
tinue, however, to add the compensatory rationale as one that justifies an accounting.
See supra note 21. The Restatement Third, treats deterrence and unjust enrichment
as among the factors that will determine whether an accounting is appropriate. Re-
statement Third, supra note 2, § 37(2)(c).
114. See Burger King, 855 F.2d at 781 (per curiam). It is "well settled that a plain-
tiff need not demonstrate actual damage to obtain an award reflecting an infringer's
profits under § 35." Id. (citing both deterrence and unjust enrichment rationales); see
also Minnesota Pet-Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 506, 511-
12 (D. Minn. 1993) ("A plaintiff need not prove actual damage or injury to obtain an
injunction [under common law or Lanham Act]; it need only establish a likelihood of
confusion among consumers." (citation omitted)).
115. This concern is not one of recent vintage, as is apparent from the following
remarks in a 1956 opinion:
It seems scarcely equitable ... for an infringer to reap the benefits of a
trade-mark he has stolen, force the registrant to the expense and delay of
litigation, and then escape payment of damages on the theory that the regis-
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that, where current remedies fail to provide monetary relief, "an
award of little more than nominal damages would encourage a coun-
terfeiter to merely switch from one infringing scheme to another as
soon as the infringed owner became aware of the fabrication.""' 6 Cer-
tainly, the trademark holder might succeed in obtaining an injunction.
But, as another court noted, "[t]o impose on the infringer nothing
more serious than an injunction when he is caught is a tacit invitation
to other infringement.""' 7
Courts have been less direct when voicing concerns that the current
structure of trademark remedies may not adequately prevent unjust
enrichment. This concern, however, may help explain a portion of the
oft-criticized opinion in U-Haul International, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc.118
There, Jartran engaged in false comparative advertising in violation of
common law and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.119 An element of
damages awarded to U-Haul was the cost of Jartran's advertising cam-
paign. 20 The district court did not award this amount as compensa-
tion for injuries to U-Haul. Rather, the court reasoned that the
advertising campaign benefited Jartran, and the benefits were at least
equal to the amount that Jartran expended on the advertising
campaign.121
On appeal in U-Haul, the Ninth Circuit seemed to realize that an
infringer can be unjustly enriched even if the infringer does not profit.
In fact, Jartran objected to the award of its advertising costs because,
during the advertising campaign, Jartran had not been profitable as a
whole. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument but did not focus this
element of damages upon the infringer's profitable transactions or, for
that matter, justify the cost of the advertising campaign as a surrogate
measure of the infringer's profitable transactions. Rather, the court
trant suffered no loss. To impose on the infringer nothing more serious than
an injunction when he is caught is a tacit invitation to other infringement.
Admiral Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 796, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
116. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., Inc, 692 F.2d 1272, 1274 (9th
Cir. 1982).
117. United States Olympic Comm. v. Union Sport Apparel, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
526, 530 (E.D. Va. 1983) (quoting Admiral Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores, Inc., 141 F.
Supp. 796, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1956)).
118. 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986).
119. Id. at 1038.
120. The district judge had calculated damages using two, distinct methods:
The first method relied on revenue projections for the U-Haul System as a
whole [which] indicated that the U-Haul System experienced a substantial
revenue shortfall [of] $20 million in actual damages. The second theory re-
lied on the cost of the advertising campaign to Jartran, $6 million, and the
cost of corrective advertising by the U-Haul System, $13.6 million[, which]
also produced an award of $20 million.
U-Haul, 793 F.2d at 1037. The Ninth Circuit reviewed and affirmed only "the calcula-
tion of the award based on advertising expenditures and the doubling of the award
under Section 35 of the Lanham Act." Id.
121. 1l at 1042.
1997] 1935
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
upheld the award as a measure of "the financial benefit Jartran re-
ceived because of the advertising."'" Implicitly, the court recognized
that an infringer can benefit from unauthorized use in ways that are
not measured by an accounting of profits.
A hypothetical example might help to illustrate how the current
structure of trademark remedies may not adequately serve the ratio-
nales of deterrence and unjust enrichment. The hypothetical is
designed, perhaps dramatically, to demonstrate how an infringer can
benefit by using a confusingly similar brandname, and yet pay no
damages whatsoever. The contours of the hypothetical are not meant
to imply limitations on fact situations in which these concerns might
arise. In fact, when a more comprehensive approach to measuring the
gains of trademark infringement is introduced later, the contours of
the hypothetical will be noted and relaxed.
To illustrate, consider a company that begins producing a new prod-
uct knowing that operations will not become profitable until a mini-
mum quantity is sold each month.' 2 To select a brandname, the
company examines and mimics the trademark of an established and
successful firm. Or, perhaps the company unwittingly designs a
brandname that is confusingly similar to a strong and valuable trade-
mark. The company does not, however, directly compete with the
trademark holder or, for that matter, operate in a manner that tar-
nishes the trademark holder's goodwill. 24 Therefore, compensatory
damages for lost profits on diverted sales or injury to goodwill are not
available. In addition, the company and the trademark holder have
had no prior dealings with respect to licensing. Consequently, the cal-
culation of a reasonable royalty is likely to be speculative and, for that
reason, not available. 2 '
During infringement, the infringer's sales are slow at first, because
retailers have not previously dealt with the company. Gradually, sales
increase as the company becomes known to retailers and consumers
associate the confusingly similar brandname with the quality and im-
age that is symbolized by the established trademark that the company
is infringing. Before our hypothetical company becomes profitable,
however, the trademark holder files an action for infringement, estab-
122. Id.
123. This aspect of the illustration is not all that hypothetical, for surprisingly large
numbers of new products are introduced each year, see Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note
49, at 19-21 (providing selected statistics and notable examples), and many of those
new products will fail to reach profitability. See id. at 21-24 ("Of thousands of new
products introduced each year, the overwhelming majority will fail.").
124. Cf. Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cnt. c, illus. 3 (measuring injury to
consumer perception of high quality by lost revenues on reduced number of sales).
125. See supra note 9.
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lishing liability and obtaining injunctive relief.126 The company imme-
diately discontinues use of the infringing brandname12 7
After infringement ceases, the company adopts a new and clearly
dissimilar brandname. When the infringer changes its brandname,
sales fall, but not because retailers have no experience with the com-
pany. Retailers continue to select and feature the infringer's product
as they did prior to the lawsuit. Rather, sales temporarily decline pri-
marily because production slows to await new labels and packaging
with the new brandname. Sales subsequently increase, but at a lower
rate of increase. Consumers need more time to associate the new and
noninfringing brandname with the same quality and image that the
established trademark conveyed.
In the hypothetical, an accounting of profits provides no relief for
the trademark holder or, for that matter, any deterrence or recovery
of unjust enrichment. The infringer never had a profitable transaction
before discontinuing unauthorized use and, consequently, never had
profits for which to account. That does not mean, however, that the
infringer did not benefit from the unauthorized use. In the hypotheti-
cal, the infringer enjoyed increasing sales both during and after the
period of infringement. To understand how unprofitable transactions
during the period of infringement can actually provide benefits to an
infringer, it is important to appreciate the marketing roles of trade-
marks and how those roles are different, depending upon the effective
point of sale.
II. EXPANDING VIEWS OF THE INFRINGER'S GAINS
A trademark is a marketing tool.128 Thus, a trademark infringer
usurps the marketing benefits of another's trademark. To appreciate
126. Trademark holders with strong evidence of liability do not need to wait for a
final judgment to obtain injunctive relief but, instead, typically obtain preliminary
injunctive relief. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 35 cmt. h ("Absent special
circumstances, courts will ordinarily grant a preliminary injunction in a trademark
infringement action if there is strong evidence of a likelihood of confusion.").
127. See id. § 36 cmt. c ("An injunction is often insufficient, however, if the plaintiff
has suffered a pecuniary loss or if the defendant has been unjustly enriched by the
wrongful conduct.").
128. See generally J. Paul Peter & James H. Donnelly, Jr., Marketing Management:
Knowledge and Skills 119 Highlight 6-4 (2d ed. 1989) (summarizing advantages of
branding). Indeed, a popular brandname is a powerful marketing tool that partici-
pants in the chain of distribution cannot ignore:
To the extent that a manufacturer has developed strong customer [loyalty]
through advertising and promotion, a particular retailer's control over that
manufacturer's brand may be reduced or negated. Virtually every grocery
store in the United States carries Heinz and Hunt's ketchups because of
strong customer loyalty to those brands. Few retailers would be willing to
risk loss of customer patronage by failing to carry such widely demanded
products.
Donald J. Bowersox et al., Management in Marketing Channels 273-74 (1980) (foot-
note omitted). Retailers and wholesalers also recognize the value of trademarks as a
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the gains of trademark infringement, this part will first explore the
costs of developing a trademark into a valuable asset to demonstrate
how infringement creates benefits at different points of sale, regard-
less of whether particular transactions are profitable.
A. The Costs Avoided by Infringing a Trademark
Historically, trademarks served the marketing function of identify-
ing a single source for a product, even if consumers did not know the
identity of the source.'2 9 Today, however, trademarks do much more.
Courts now recognize that trademarks also signal the quality of a
product 130 or the stylized image associated with a particular line of
goods. 13 1 Information about the quality and image of a product is im-
marketing tool, and consequently, have started to develop their own. Id. at 273 (not-
ing "[i]ncreasing use of private brands by retailers"); id. at 277 ("Adoption of distribu-
tor brands is another means through which wholesalers have been able to increase
retailer dependence."); id. at 278 (noting use of "private labels" by voluntary organi-
zations of independent retailers such as Independent Grocers Association, Western
Auto, and Ben Franklin Stores).
129. Today, courts continue to recognize this function of trademarks: "[W]hile the
public is not required to identify the actual name of the manufacturer/trademark
owner, the public must perceive that the product emanates from a single source."
Ginger Group, Ltd., v. Beatrice Co., 678 F. Supp. 555, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (citing
Premier Dental Prods. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 856 (3d Cir. 1986)).
130. E.g., August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995)
("Trademarks designate the origin and quality of products."); Qualitex Co. v. Jacob-
son Products Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1303 (1995) (stating that trademark law "en-
courage[s] the production of quality products" (quotations omitted)); c.f. William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. &
Econ. 265, 275 (1987) (arguing that trademarks enable consumers to economize on
the search costs of finding the desired quality product). Marketing scholars also rec-
ognize the benefits, in terms of increased profits, of trademarks that signal quality.
Peter & Donnelly, supra note 128, at 119 Highlight 6-4 ("By offering customers what
amounts to a 'guarantee' of quality, branders may be able to obtain a price that is
higher than the cost of giving this guarantee.").
131. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987)
(" 'Famous trademarks offer a particularly powerful means of conjuring up the image
of their owners, and thus become an important, perhaps at times indispensable, part
of the public vocabulary.'" (quoting Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech:
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade
Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 158, 195-96)).
In some cases, the brandname itself may become an implicit but desired attribute
because the brandname is itself the style that consumers want:
A product, however, also possesses implicit characteristics which are for
the most part intangible. These implicit characteristics, although less obvi-
ous and often overlooked, can be just as, if not more, important than their
tangible counterparts. Such implicit attributes may include brand name ....
These implicit attributes offer implicit performance in the sense that they
provide certain rewards that are associated with some brands but not with
others. While all cars offer the same basic and obvious benefit (i.e., trans-
portation), some offer a greater number of implicit benefits. A Cadillac is
certainly different from a Yugo or a Hyundai in terms of implicit perform-
ance (e.g., prestige). Sony, likewise, consciously emphasizes the brand's im-
plicit aspects by proclaiming "It's a Sony."
See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 4-5.
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portant to purchasers, and much of marketing focuses upon conveying
these kinds of information to market participants. 132 Thus, a trade-
mark can be a valuable marketing tool, especially if the trademark
signals important information more efficiently than other forms of
marketing, such as general advertising or point of sale promotions. 133
A trademark, however, does not become a valuable marketing tool
overnight. A new brandname with which market participants have
little experience may not signal much, if anything, to retailers who
select products to carry or to consumers who purchase particular
products. Gradually, however, market participants may come to asso-
ciate the trademark with a particular source, level of quality, or styl-
ized image. When these associations become fixed in the minds of
market participants, the trademark signals important marketing infor-
mation about the product to market participants.1 3 Only then does
132. Trademarks may go even further and create an "aura" that surrounds a prod-
uct or the context in which the product is sold. For example, the trademark of a
franchise may signal the atmosphere at the franchise as much as the source, quality, or
style of the food:
Consumers buy ice cream not because of the physical ingredients but be-
cause they expect much more. As explained by Irvin Robbins of Baskin-
Robbins, "We don't sell ice cream; we sell fun." Baskin-Robbins's variety of
ice cream flavors is a reflection of this statement. Among the flavors offered
are Nutcracker Sweet, Jack Lemmon, Hold that Lime, and Here Comes the
Fudge.
Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 3-4; see also id at 5 (stating that because "[o]ne
can get just as drunk drinking cheap stuff," a distiller "is really selling ... the glamour
and prestige that is found in a bottle of Seagram"). For additional examples of brands
that are associated with status and prestige, see Michael E. Porter, Competitive Ad-
vantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance 143 (1985) (citing as exam-
pies, Smirnoff vodka and the Gulfstream I business jet).
133. As one author has noted, because buyers have incomplete knowledge, buyers
often look to a variety of "signals of value": "Buyers use such indications as advertis-
ing, reputation, packaging, the professionalism, appearance, and personality of sup-
plier employees, the attractiveness of facilities, and information provided in sales
presentations to infer the value a firm will or does create." Porter, supra note 132, at
139. Trademarks can be added to this list. See Peter & Donnelly, supra note 128, at
119 ("A good brand speeds up shopping for the customer and thus reduces the mar-
keter's selling time and effort.").
134. Trademarks are not the only ways that producers signal value to market par-
ticipants. See Porter, supra note 132, at 144-46 (1985) (listing twelve typical signalling
criteria).
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the trademark gain strength 135 and become a valuable marketing
tool.13
6
As a marketing asset, a valuable or strong trademark is best charac-
terized as a fixed cost. To be sure, each sale of a product to which the
trademark is affixed helps market participants associate the trademark
with a unique marketing message. But, from the perspective of the
trademark holder, the variable costs of affixing the trademark to each
product are minimal. The significant costs of developing the trade-
mark lie elsewhere. One cost is in the initial selection and design of a
trademark, a process that may involve market surveys and other re-
search efforts. 1 37 Another cost consists of other marketing efforts,
such as general advertising, that prompt consumers to purchase the
product so that they can begin associating the trademark with a
unique marketing message. 13  A potentially significant cost includes
efforts to investigate and prosecute unauthorized uses. All of these
costs are fairly characterized as fixed because these costs do not vary
with the quantity of the product that is produced.
Because an established trademark represents a fixed cost marketing
asset, unauthorized use enables an infringer to avoid fixed cost mar-
keting efforts. By copying an established trademark-or using a
brandname that is confusingly similar-the infringer may avoid many
of the initial costs of selecting and designing a trademark. So too, the
infringer avoids some of the costs of other marketing efforts that ini-
tially prompt consumers to purchase the infringer's product. Almost
by definition, an infringer will avoid costs of investigating and prose-
cuting unauthorized uses. Even if the infringer must defend an action
for infringement, the infringer will gain if the infringer can benefit in
135. The use of the word "strength" in the text is not unintentional, for the strength
of a mark has legal significance:
Thus, the rationale is that the more ditinctive, unique and well-known the
mark, the deeper is the impression it creates upon the public's consciousness
and the greater the scope of protection to which it is entitled. The legal
strength of a mark is usually the same as its economic and marketing
strength.
1 McCarthy, supra note 3, § 11:24.
136. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 5 ("[Clonsumers often base their
purchase of products on symbolic representations within those products such as fash-
ion, value, status, prestige, and so forth.").
137. See id. at 26-27 (citing examples of test marketing to determine, among other
things, market reaction to brandnames); Douglas J. Dalrymple & Leonard J. Parsons,
Marketing Management: Strategy and Cases 346-47 (4th ed. 1986) (describing
sources for brandnames and citing example of test marketing).
138. Where the type of product is new, as opposed to a new brand of an existing
product, some of these marketing efforts may be directed towards creating generic
demand so that consumers will try the new kind of product. See Onkvisit & Shaw,
supra note 49, at 105 ("[A] market leader can continue to combine both primary [ge-
neric] demand and selective [brand-specific] demand in his advertising because he is
assured of a large proportion of any increase in demand.").
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ways that are not reflected in damage remedies, such as an accounting
of profits that is restricted by traditional limitations.
B. The Benefits of Infringing a Trademark
Although trademark infringement allows the infringer to avoid
fixed cost marketing efforts, the primary benefits of using an estab-
lished trademark are the increased sales and revenues that flow from
the use of a valuable marketing tool.139 The object of marketing, in-
cluding the development of a strong and valuable trademark, is to in-
crease sales and gross revenues." ° By using an already established
trademark, the infringer also stands to benefit from increased sales.
Indeed, this much has been long recognized by courts that use an ac-
counting as a surrogate measure of the trademark holder's loss of
sales. The sales lost by the trademark holder and diverted to the in-
fringer are, from the infringer's perspective, sales that increased as a
benefit of infringing upon a valuable trademark.
1. Sales to Consumers
The benefits of the increased sales and revenues that flow from in-
fringement can be appreciated on two levels, each of which suggests a
different effective point of sale in the chain of distribution. One, and
perhaps the most obvious, is the level of consumer purchases. In
modern commerce, consumers often do not have the time, expertise,
or opportunity to inform themselves about products before each
purchase. 14 1 When making repeat purchases of the same kind of
product, consumers often rely upon trademarks and the reputations
associated with trademarks. 42 By purchasing the same brand, con-
139. See Peter & Donnelly, supra note 128, at 119 Highlight 6-4 (stating that
"[w]hen a customer finds it convenient to repeat purchases by brand, promotion costs
are reduced and sales volume is increased").
140. Of course, marketers also strive to lower costs by achieving marketing goals by
the most efficient means. Bowersox et al, supra note 128, at 235 ("The goal of a
manufacturing operation in channel design is to achieve effective performance of all
marketing functions at the minimum total cost expenditure."); Peter & Donnelly,
supra note 128, at 185 ("In terms of distribution costs, it generally is assumed that the
total system should be designed to minimize costs, other things being equaL").
141. See Chester R. Wasson, Dynamic Competitive Strategy & Product Life Cycles
37 (3d ed. 1978) ("The buyer hopes to find a dependable source for a key item in
some use-system and thus avoid further search and experimentation."). The desire to
reduce search costs is increasingly true for women, whose growing participation in the
work force limits the amount of time available for consumer activities. See Onkvisit &
Shaw, supra note 49, at 46-48 (noting that "modem working women find it difficult to
shop during regular shopping hours" and that "[m]arketers have now begun to recog-
nize the changing role of women").
142. See Peter & Donnelly, supra note 128, at 119 ("[Blrand loyalty provides pro-
tection from competition because the brander, in effect, is given a customer
franchise."); Wasson, supra note 141, at 33 ("[A]ssociations and experience can often
affect the reception and sales of a product more strongly than anything done directly
by current advertising or in terms of current product itself.").
19971 1941
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sumers strive to assure that they obtain the same level of quality or
stylized image with each purchase. 43 So too, when trying a new prod-
uct or new brand of a product, consumers may rely upon established
trademarks with which they are well acquainted, even if consumers
became acquainted with those trademarks on a different kind of prod-
uct. 44 Consequently, unauthorized use benefits infringers through in-
creased sales where the effective point of sale is at the level of
consumer purchases.'45
2. Sales to Retailers
Consumers are not the only market participants, 46 and infringers
may benefit on the level where sales are made to retailers. 47 It is not
143. Here, the benefit of a valuable trademark as a marketing tool is with inducing
not so much the initial or trial purchase, but rather repeat purchases or adoption:
Adoption should not be considered the equivalent of a trial purchase. A
one-time purchase is not an adoption, but continued purchases do constitute
an adoption. A consumer's adoption involves the conviction that the
purchased product is desirable, and this conviction involves an acceptance or
commitment on the part of the consumer as related to the product.
Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 62.
144. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 124 ("Brand extension is the strategy
to extend a brand, usually a popular one, by putting the name on new products.");
Peter & Donnelly, supra note 128, at 119 Highlight 6-4 ("Good brands can enhance
the company's name, simplifying the introduction of additional products."). This con-
sumer characteristic suggests a competitive strategy for an established finn that is not
the first to market a new kind of product: "By extending an established and popular
name to a new product, a company can minimize the strategic advantage of the first
entrant." Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 113.
145. Courts recognize the marketing role of trademarks where the effective point of
sale is to consumers. United States Olympic Comm. v. Union Sport Apparel, 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 526, 529 (E.D. Va. 1983) (The development of a strong and valuable
trademark "creates the opportunity for others to ride on the goodwill of [the trade-
mark holder] in the effort to attract customers to goods and services which may be
thought by consumers to be in some way associated with [the trademark holder]."
(quotation and citations omitted)).
146. The discussion in the text follows a rather simplified view of distribution and
omits the consideration of other kinds of channel participants, such as wholesalers,
who may play significant roles. See Bowersox et al., supra note 128, at 194-96 ("Small
manufacturers usually must rely on wholesalers for product distribution."); Peter &
Donnelly, supra note 128, at 179-85 (describing variety of channels of distribution for
consumer and industrial goods); see also id. at 176 ("[P]roducers use marketing in-
termediaries [such as wholesales and retailers] because the intermediary can perform
functions more cheaply and more efficiently than the producer can."). This simplifica-
tion does not detract from the central point being made in the text, that to the extent
the effective point of sale is not at the level where sales are made to consumers, trade-
mark infringement may produce benefits that linger after infringement ceases.
147. The importance of distribution policy, where sales are made to retailers with
the hopes of obtaining the best distribution services, is now well recognized. See Was-
son, supra note 141, at 241-43 (recognizing that "distribution policy is just as sensitive
to the phases of the product life cycle as any other element of the mix"); Porter, supra
note 132, at 123 (noting how a producer can advantageously differentiate its products
through selection of distribution channels); Bowersox et al., supra note 128, at 189
("Effective and efficient market performance is directly related to the structure of the
distribution channel.").
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feasible for retailers to carry every brand of every product avail-
able.'" Of course, retailers who specialize in particular kinds of prod-
ucts will not purchase products outside of their area of specialization.
Beyond that, however, retailers may select products or brands of
products depending upon the reputation that the retailer seeks to fos-
ter for its outlet. 49 Retailers who emphasize low prices may seek out
brands that cost the least.150 Retailers who emphasize quality may
carry brands that meet minimum product standards .15  And, retailers
who emphasize fashion may carry brands that are associated with a
particular stylized image.'52
Even when a retailer has selected particular brands for its outlet, a
retailer does not treat every brand equally. Not every product is fa-
vored with a prime location, such as preferred shelf space, where the
product can be displayed advantageously to consumers. In fact, some
manufacturers today pay significant fees to retailers to assure that re-
tailers place their products on preferred shelf space.153 Similarly, not
every brand is favored by inclusion in the outlet's own marketing ef-
forts. Here as well, some manufacturers today provide financial sup-
port to retailers to assist in the outlet's marketing efforts, even though
those efforts may feature or promote the outlet as much as any partic-
ular brand."5
To the extent that consumers shop by choosing a particular outlet
and then purchasing a product made available by the retailer, 155 the
effective point of sale is the decision by the retailer to select and fea-
148. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 104 ("After all, retailers have shelf
space for only a few brands."). Interestingly, when manufacturers test market a new
product, they seek to determine, among other things, "distribution acceptance" or the
willingness of retailers to select and feature the new product. See id. at 26-28 (Min-
netonka found that Softsoap "gained retailers' acceptance easily because it was the
first product form of its kind, offering retailers higher gross margins without product
duplication.").
149. Indeed, a retailer has every incentive to develop a marketing strategy that de-
velops a loyalty among consumers to shop at that particular retail outlet. Of course,
such a loyalty among consumers bestows market power upon the retailer. See Bower-
sox et al., supra note 128, at 272-74 (discussing sources of market power for retailers).
150. See id. at 349 (noting that, when resale price maintenance was no longer avail-
able to manufacturers, discount houses emerged in retailing).
151. See generally Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price Mainte-
nance and Quality Certification, 15 Rand J. Econ. 346 (1984).
152. Id
153. See Bowersox et al., supra note 128, at 238 ("This battle for shelf space or
display space is constant among manufacturers selling products within the same retail
outlet.").
154. From the manufacturer's perspective, this is sometimes known as a "push"
strategy: "The manufacturer may encourage channel members to carry the product
by offering high margins, free cases, 'buy five, get one free,' trade promotions such as
retail displays and cooperative advertising allowances, and sales-force training and
aids." Id. at 237.
155. See Wasson, supra note 141, at 93-94 (citing food store example where price-
quality relationships on some items attract consumers who then purchase other
items); id. at 181 ("[Elven when the availability is comparable, buyers usually have
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ture the product at its outlet." 6 To be sure, the decision to carry a
product is influenced by the cost of the product to the retailer. Just as
significant are other factors that can be best characterized in terms of
the personal reputation of the producer.157 Retailers may prefer pro-
ducers with a reputation for independently promoting their own
brands.' 8 Or, retailers may prefer producers with a reputation for
working with retailers, either to design products that consumers pre-
fer 159 or to resolve warranty problems after sales.' 60 Retailers may
also prefer producers with a reputation for filling orders promptly' 61
strong preferences based on the tie-in benefits which go with the sale, or the friend-
ship and trust developed through a long association with the sales personnel.").
156. As one author has noted:
The decision maker may not necessarily be the person who pays for the
product (e.g., the doctor, not the patient, chooses drugs) and may be differ-
ent from the user (e.g., the purchasing agent chooses a product used in the
plant). The [distribution] channel may also make its own decision ... to
stock a firm's product and whether the firm is a desirable supplier.
Porter, supra note 132, at 140-41 (1985). And, as others noted, "The supporting con-
cept [for one kind of marketing strategy] is that profitable volume can be added if
products can be exposed to any point-of-sale location patronized by the desired target
market clientele." Bowersox et al., supra note 128, at 238. See generally id. at 336-35
(noting that all channel participants seek to develop customer loyalty and engage in
"competition for differential advantage").
157. As one author has noted: "In addition, [distribution] channels will have their
own use criteria that measure sources of value in a firm's dealings with them. For
example, channels will often want credit, responsiveness to inquiries, or technical sup-
port that the end buyer may not notice at all." Porter, supra note 132, at 143-44; see
also id. at 125 (noting that "channel linkages" are ways to coordinate and jointly opti-
mize activities with dealers).
158. From the manufacturer's perspective, this is sometimes known as a "pull"
strategy:
One outstanding example of a channel pull strategy is the marketing practice
followed by breakfast cereal processors. Major cereal companies utilize all
forms of mass communications to create a brand preference among consum-
ers. The objective of a pull strategy is to stimulate sufficient consumer desire
for the brand to encourage or force retailers to stock that as well as other
products sold by the same manufacturer.
Bowersox et al., supra note 128, at 237.
159. One group of authors noted that, where retailers become powerful, they can
sometimes take the lead in product development:
Ultimately the [retail] chain [of stores may become so powerful that it can
dictate product designs and innovations to manufacturing firms. Some gro-
cery chains have their own test kitchens which constantly look for new for-
mulations and products to satisfy consumers. Once these products are
developed, the chain seeks a manufacturer to act as a source of supply for
the item. Other examples can be found in many industries ranging from
apparel to furniture where leading retail chains employ their own staff de-
signers and have products manufactured to specification.
Id. at 275.
160. See Wasson, supra note 141, at 243 (explaining that a "specialty manufacturer
[selects] a few outlets in order to make it interesting to that outlet to continue to
handle and to work with the manufacturer").
161. See generally Bowersox et al., supra note 128, at 210-13 (discussing importance
of transportation, warehousing, and inventory costs in channel design). This factor is
important to toy retailers. Id. at 266 ("All [toy] retail outlets, however, were very
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or providing flexible payment terms.162 Finally, retailers may prefer
producers with a reputation for maintaining a particular level of qual-
ity or stylized image.'6'
In fact, one of the most difficult tasks of marketing a new product to
consumers today is to convince retailers to select and feature a partic-
ular brand."6 Gaining a toehold in a retail outlet is not an easy
task, 65 especially for a new producer who does not already enjoy a
concerned with prompt delivery of initial orders and reorders, and with quick replace-
ment of defective products."). This factor is similarly important to apparel retailers.
Id. at 276 ("Many retail clothing stores are beginning to buy much closer to their
actual selling season and are requiring that manufacturers schedule deliveries to meet
store needs.... demanding faster and more frequent delivery, markdown participa-
tion, and buy-back of unsold merchandise."). Prompt shipment is also important to
those retailers who provide post-sale service and depend upon the manufacturer to
supply repair parts. See id. at 206 (noting that the "most critical measure of customer
service is inventory availability for servicing orders").
162. See id at 269 ("[Toy] manufacturers might offer retailers quantity discounts,
prepayment of shipping charges, promotional allowances and deferred payment
terms."); id at 313 ("[T]o finance increased inventories[, w]orking capital can be
raised ... by leaning on one's suppliers and delaying payment on accounts payable,
thereby losing any discount terms ....").
163. See Wasson, supra note 141, at 32 ("Similarly, products distributed through
prestige channels and outlets, initially at least, tend to gain a prestige image. And a
premium product cannot be sold in an outlet associated with low-end products.").
164. This is especially true for a new kind of product or product innovation. See
Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 62 (explaining that a new kind of product "is
relatively useless to consumers unless marketers are willing to assume risks in intro-
ducing the new item."). Other commentators have expressed the same:
If customers are inclined to demand a particular brand, retailers and, conse-
quently, wholesalers will be anxious to participate in marketing new prod-
ucts because of potential benefits. On the other hand a small manufacturer
of a new product may find it difficult to attract potential channel partners
because the manufacturer cannot offer market power as an incentive in
channel negotiation.
Bowersox et al., supra note 128, at 194; see generally Wasson supra note 141, at 264-68
(discussing general ways for a manufacturer to buy distribution services).
165. Of course, an established and strong trademark might be the difference in
gaining that toehold-
If the product is a new offering of a recognized brand-name manufacturer
and significant introductory advertising is planned, customer acceptance will
most likely be high and middlemen will be eager to add the new product.
However, for new products with little market acceptance and low brand
identification, aggressive selling at each level of the channel will be
necessary.
Bowersox et al., supra note 128, at 205. Even so, a retailer with local monopoly power
may be the one with the upper hand in negotiations:
Related to local monopoly is the concept of retail customer franchise. The
ability of a retail firm to develop strong and/or large customer following can
make that firm a critical channel link to a supplier. In effect, the process of
developing such loyalty serves to enhance that retailer's monopoly position.
Id. at 273; see also Peter & Donnelly, supra note 128, at 181 Highlight 10-2 ("In some
instances [the intermediary's] local strength is so great that a manufacturer is virtually
unable to tap that market, except through [that intermediary].").
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favorable reputation among successful retailers. 166 To carry the new
product, a retailer likely will displace other products. If the retailer is
successful, which is why a new producer wants a retailer to carry the
new product in the first place, 67 the displaced products are likely
profitable for the retailer to carry. 16 8 Thus, retailers who take on a
new product are gambling, on the basis of hopes and promises, that
the new product will generate more retail profits than the displaced
products generated. 69
When retailers decide to carry a product that holds every promise
of increasing sales and revenue, retailers may not know that the
brandname infringes a trademark. For example, retailers may not
know that trademark protection extends into product and geographic
markets in which the trademark holder does not compete. And, re-
tailers may not be aware of some of the more technical aspects of
trademark law. For example, sometimes a producer may not be per-
mitted to use the producer's personal name as a trademark. A trade-
mark holder who is the first to register can prevent a prior but
unregistered user from expanding. And, specialized kinds of trade-
marks, such as group marks or certification marks, have their own,
technical requirements. Retailers may be sophisticated market par-
ticipants, but they may not be so sophisticated that they understand
the nuances of trademark law.170
166. By contrast, manufacturers who already enjoy a favorable reputation with re-
tailers enjoy a tremendous advantage. For example:
Playtex, by using its existing distribution network to market its Jhirmack
shampoo, was able to eliminate heavy startup costs. Tambrands, with
220,000 retail outlets in place to carry its Tampax tampons and Maxithins
pads, found it relatively easy to utilize this distribution system for its new
over-the-counter products which allowed home testing for ovulation and
pregnancy.
Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 31; see also id. at 105 ("A strong distribution
network of loyal and competent members can provide a competitive advantage.").
Moreover, manufacturers who already enjoy a favorable reputation with retailers
can employ a defensive strategy to "make[ ] it more difficult for a challenger to gain
access to distribution channels." Porter, supra note 132, at 489-90 (including tactics of
filling or expanding product lines and supplying private label sellers).
167. See generally Bowersox et al., supra note 128, at 196 ("The degree of customer
preference a retailer enjoys in a specific area will have a direct bearing upon channel
negotiation. The retailer's financial capability and size can be expected to influence
the degree of vertical integration desired in channel design."); id. at 242 (noting the
importance of estimating costs and revenues in channel selection); Peter & Donnelly,
supra note 128, at 184 (providing that in selective distribution, a "manufacturer limits
the use of middlemen to the ones believed to be the best available").
168. See generally Bowersox et al., supra note 128, at 299-321 (discussing factors
that indicate profitability of retailers and other channel members).
169. See id. at 313 (noting that a retailer might finance inventory of one product by
"invest[ing] released capital in inventory of other product lines").
170. Sometimes, even sophisticated manufacturers may run afoul of the trademark
laws. For example, "[s]everal years ago, Colgate introduced a liquid cleaner called
Gene and was surprised to find another company was already selling a cleaner under
the registered name Jenie. Although the names were spelled differently, Colgate was
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A benefit of infringement, then, is the enhanced opportunity to con-
vince successful retailers to select the product for their customers and,
hopefully for the infringer, increase sales even more by featuring the
product. The enhanced opportunity is not likely created by any confu-
sion as to the source of the new product. Presumably, retailers know
the producers with whom they are dealing or, at the very least, ascer-
tain the source of the products they, the retailers, carry.1 Nonethe-
less, the infringing brandname may help create the opportunity in one
of at least two ways. First, by mimicking an established trademark
that is associated with a particular quality or stylized image, the in-
fringer may signal to the retailer that the new product will have the
same quality and stylized image. Second, by mimicking an established
trademark of a successful product, the infringer may more easily con-
vince the retailer that the new product likely will generate sales and
profits for the retailer."7
If the enhanced opportunity leads to long-term relations with suc-
cessful retailers, the producer's reputation among successful retailers
is itself a valuable marketing tool.173 Like a trademark, that reputa-
forced to withdraw its product from the market at a substantial financial loss." Dal-
rymple & Parsons, supra note 137, at 317.
171. Where a retailer does not deal directly with a producer, however, the retailer
may not know the source of the product or, for that matter, whether the product
carries an infringing brandname. For example, a retailer may purchase products from
a distributor who purchased gray market goods that were imported in violation of the
exclusive trademark license of a domestic distributor. Or, a retailer may purchase
products from a source that, for whatever reason, is selling counterfeit goods.
172. For a new kind of product or product innovation that represents the greatest
risk, retailers may carry the product only where an initial group of venturesome con-
sumers already accepts the product, thereby signalling that other groups of consumers
will also accept the product. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 70 (noting that
without the initial consumers' support, "retailers will not carry or continue to carry
the new product.").
173. Interestingly, to the extent that trademark protection provides incentives to
create brandnames as valuable marketing assets, the resulting proliferation of brands
only increases the value of developing favorable relations with retailers. As one study
notes:
Ironically, as new products are marketed, these new products force com-
panies to come up with even more new products. The massive proliferation
of new consumer goods shortens the life cycle of existing products while in-
creasing marketing costs. With more choices, consumers are readily inclined
to become less brand loyal. Such brand indifference only forces manufactur-
ers to create new products to keep their customers.
Id at 21. The proliferation of brands thus provides incentives to increase marketing
efforts at the level where sales are made to retailers. Indeed, one author suggests
that, over time, the benefits of established relations with retailers will outweigh the
benefits of the brandname:
As the growth proceeds and the growth rate begins to level off, intensified
attention should be paid to getting and maintaining as intensive and exten-
sive distribution as possible. Continued concern with dealer service is a
must. ... [D]istribution becomes an important element in brand differentia-
tion because... consumers begin to see less and less difference between
makes.
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tion is best characterized as a fixed cost marketing asset. Although a
producer's reputation among successful retailers is built over time as
sales are made, that reputation, once earned, does not vary with the
quantity of the product that is thereafter produced. Unlike a trade-
mark, however, this fixed cost marketing asset does not reside in any
particular brandname. Indeed, a producer of several products, all
with different brandnames, may enjoy a favorable reputation among
successful retailers that includes any product or any brandname. 174
Rather, given that retailers presumably know the identity of produ-
cers, the long-term relation is an asset that resides in the personal rep-
utation or personality of the producer.
Of course, a producer can lose the favorable reputation on which
the long-term relationship is built, and one way to tarnish that reputa-
tion is to use a brandname that infringes a trademark. In fact, a re-
tailer who carries infringing products faces potential liability. 175
Nonetheless, the extent to which infringement will, in practice, disrupt
the relation between the infringer and its retailers is not altogether
clear. The trademark holder may not have strong incentives to pursue
remedies against retailers, especially if those retailers also carry the
trademark holder's products or the trademark holder wants to avoid a
reputation in the trade for filing lawsuits against retailers. The infring-
ing producer may take steps to minimize any adverse consequences
by, for example, characterizing the infringement as technical and un-
knowing or, perhaps, promising to hold the retailer harmless. 76 In
any event, if the producer's reputation is based upon other factors,
such as prompt shipments or flexible payment terms, trademark in-
fringement may be only a temporary setback in sales of the product
that carried the infringing brandname.
Wasson, supra note 141, at 242-43.
174. See Bowersox et al., supra note 128, at 203 ("Manufacturers sometimes use
multiple brands to offer exclusive distribution to more than one retailer or distribu-
tor."); Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 10-15 (citing examples of successful compa-
nies, such as General Mills, Proctor & Gamble, and R.J. Reynolds, whose products
include a diverse mix of unrelated products sold under different brandnames).
175. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 36 cmt. k. The Restatement Third
states:
Retailers who sell goods bearing an infringing mark or who republish a mis-
representation originating with the manufacturer of the goods are subject to
liability, but the extent to which the resale or republication was innocent and.
the extent to which monetary relief is available from the initial source of the
goods are relevant in determining whether an award of damages against the
retailer is appropriate.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (1994) (authorizing court to order ex parte seizure of
goods bearing counterfeit marks); Restatement Third, supra note 2, § 35 cmt. g ("The
court may require, for example, the recall of infringing goods or the recall or destruc-
tion of deceptive promotional materials.").
176. United States Olympic Comm. v. Union Sport Apparel, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
526, 528 (E.D. Va. 1983) (finding that after the retailer expressed concerns that a logo
might infringe another's trademark, the producer agreed to indemnify retailer).
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The initial unauthorized use thus may help to establish long-term
relations with successful retailers, and the resulting benefits of the un-
authorized use may likely continue after infringement ceases. These
long-term benefits, however, may not obtain in every market. These
benefits are most plausible where the effective point of sale is the de-
cision by the retailer to carry the product and where the long-term
relation is an asset that resides in the personal reputation or personal-
ity of the producer. Where the effective point of sale is to the retailer,
benefits of increased sales flow from the retailer's decision to select
and feature a particular product. And, where the long-term relation is
an asset that resides in the personal reputation or personality of the
producer, those benefits likely will linger after infringement ceases.
C. Benefits Without Profiting During Infringement
The insights of the preceding discussion help explain how unauthor-
ized use in the hypothetical illustration produced benefits, even
though the infringer never had a profitable transaction during the pe-
riod of infringement. When infringement started, the infringer gained
from an enhanced opportunity to establish relations with retailers.
Although retailers had not previously dealt with the company, the in-
fringing brandname likely signalled that the new product would have
the same quality and stylized image of the trademarked product,
which was already established and successful. Believing that the new
product would therefore generate profits, retailers carried more of the
new product and provided more promotional efforts than if the prod-
uct had a brandname that did not yet signal quality or image.
During the period of infringement, the infringer also gained from
increased sales. To the extent that the effective point of sale is the
level where sales are made to retailers, the infringer benefitted from
the retailer's decision to select and feature the new product: Consum-
ers purchase more of the infringer's product because consumers select
outlets and then purchase products made available by the retailer. To
the extent that the effective point of sale is the level where sales are
made to consumers, the infringer likely benefited from increased in-
terest among consumers: Consumers purchase more of the infringer's
product because the infringing brandname signalled to consumers that
the new product would have the same quality and stylized image of
the trademarked product. And, sales at both levels likely increased at
a faster rate than if the product had a brandname that market partici-
pants did not previously associate with a level of quality or a stylized
image.
In the hypothetical, the charges of infringement resulted in a de-
dine in sales, but it was a temporary setback only. No doubt produc-
tion slowed when the infringing company selected a new and
dissimilar brandname and then waited for new labels and packaging.
Sales did not drop precipitously, however. By now, the infringer's re-
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lations with established retailers is an asset that primarily resides in
the personal reputation or personality of the company, but not as
much in a particular brandname. Consequently, those retailers con-
tinued to select and feature the infringer's product, albeit one with a
new brandname. And, consumers who shop by choosing a particular
outlet will continue to purchase the infringer's product at those retail-
ers's outlets. Aside from the production delay, the inability to resume
the previous rate of sales probably resulted more from the use of a
brandname with which consumers and new retailers were not yet ac-
quainted. A new brandname does not become a strong and valuable
trademark overnight. Rather, the infringer must wait for market par-
ticipants to associate the new brandname with a favorable marketing
message.
After the unauthorized use ceased, the infringer continued to reap
some of the benefits initially gained during the period of infringement.
At the level where sales are made to consumers, benefits likely ceased
when the new brandname was selected. The favorable associations
signalled by the infringing brandname reside in the successful trade-
mark, and thus do not transfer to a new and dissimilar brandname. At
the level where sales are made to the retailers, however, benefits con-
tinue. The opportunity to establish relations with retailers was ini-
tially created, in part, by the favorable associations of the infringing
brandname. But because that asset, once established, resides primar-
ily in the personal reputation or personality of the company, the bene-
fit of established relations continues after the change in brandname.
If the unauthorized use helped create valuable relations that last after
infringement ceases, the benefits of unauthorized use also last after
infringement ceases.
In the hypothetical illustration, and in theory, the unauthorized use
of a strong and valuable trademark allows an infringer to avoid the
fixed costs of creating valuable marketing assets. As explained above,
a trademark is a fixed cost marketing asset, and the reputation earned
by the producer also is a fixed cost marketing asset. Consequently,
unauthorized use allows the infringer to avoid some of the fixed costs
of creating these marketing assets. For example, by mimicking an es-
tablished and successful trademark, the infringer lowers the costs of
selecting and designing a trademark which might otherwise require
market surveys or other research efforts. Similarly, by mimicking an
established and successful trademark, the infringer lowers the costs of
establishing relations with successful retail outlets which might other-
wise require, for example, payments for preferred shelf space.'77
177. These benefits of infringing a valuable trademark are analogous to those of an
innovator who creates a more valuable product and, thus, has a relative advantage in
marketing to retailers:
One way of supporting a unique image and skimming pricing is by having
a strong distribution network in place. This is highly practical and appropri-
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The true benefits of trademark infringement, however, are revenues
from sales that increased more than if the product had a brandname
with which market participants were not previously acquainted. 178 By
using a brandname that is confusingly similar to an established and
successful trademark, the infringer avoids costs that do not vary with
the quantity of the product that is produced. But, infringement helps
create marketing assets whose benefits vary with the quantity of the
product that is sold to retailers and then to consumers. Even if the
increased sales do not result in one profitable transaction, the in-
creased revenues only defray other costs. In this sense, unauthorized
use produces gains by allowing an unprofitable infringer to avoid even
greater financial losses. To show how to measure these gains, the dis-
cussion will next examine the pattern of revenues earned during a
product's typical life cycle.
III. BRANDNAMES AND PRODUCT LIFE CYCLES
The significant gains of trademark infringement lie in the benefits of
increased sales and gross revenues. These benefits are not necessarily
restricted to the period of infringement. To be sure, where consumers
rely upon trademarks to select products, benefits likely are limited to
the period when the infringer used the confusingly similar brandname.
But, where retailers initially rely upon trademarks to select and fea-
ture particular products, benefits likely last as long as the infringer
maintains the favorable reputation established during infringement.
Potentially, the gains of trademark infringement last well into the life
cycle of a product that started with an infringing brandname but then
switched to a new and dissimilar brandname.
A. Product Life Cycles
Those who study a typical product's life cycle commonly use the
following graph to depict sales and gross revenues: 179
ate, since the innovating firm is in a favorable position to pick the best deal-
ers. Dealer support is critical, and latecomers will find it difficult to secure
good dealers. In addition, a newcomer may find the required network to be
extremely costly, not to mention the amount of time needed to build such a
distribution network.
Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 151.
178. See Porter, supra note 132, at 139 ("A firm that delivers only modest value but
signals it more effectively may actually command a higher price than a firm that deliv-
ers higher value but signals it poorly.").
179. E.g., Bruce L. Bowerman & Richard T. O'Connell, Forecasting & Time Series
17 (1979); Dalrymple & Parsons, supra note 137, at 37-38; Onkvisit & Shaw, supra
note 49, at 90, 115; Peter & Donnelly, supra note 128, at 117-21; see also Wasson,
supra note 141, at 61 (providing depictions of four basic life cycle forms: high learning
introductions, low learning introductions, fads, and fashion cycles); id. at 243 ("The
label, 'product life cycles,' has been variously used to cover both product category life
cycles, and competitive brand life cycles, no matter where introduced in the basic
category life cycle."). Of course, this typical depiction is not meant to exclude the
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In addition, those who study a typical product's life cycle describe
different portions of the graph in terms that are consistent with the
preceding discussion. 180 The initial period is labelled "Introduction."
This portion of the curve is the initial range that has a positive slope
but does not yet demonstrate significant or dramatic growth in sales
and gross revenues. An intuitive explanation of the introduction pe-
riod of the product centers around the fact that, in this phase, neither
retailers nor consumers are acquainted with the producer or its prod-
uct's brandname. Consequently, few retailers carry the product, and
few consumers purchase the product. Sales and gross revenues are
low but begin to increase as retailers and consumers begin to associate
the new brandname with a particular source, level of quality, or styl-
ized image.181
possibility that a single product's life may have more than one cycle. See Onkvisit &
Shaw, supra note 49, at 72-73, 98-99 (citing examples, including coal, which, as an
energy source, became relatively obsolete and then regained popularity). And, this
typical depiction must incorporate additional complexity to describe marketing in an
international context. See id. at 137-57. This same life cycle theory has been used to
explain the evolution of retail institutions and channels of distribution. See Bowersox
et al., supra note 128, at 340-41 (dividing cycle into four stages of innovation, acceler-
ated development, maturity, and decline).
180. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 89 ("A few authors go beyond these
usual stages [introduction, growth, maturation, and decline], but their finer, more de-
tailed classifications do not seem to contribute any significant distinctions .... ."); cf.
Wasson, supra note 141, at 4-11 (describing eight stages of a life cycle and distinguish-
ing nine kinds of life cycles); see also Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 130-33 (dis-
cussing marketing strategy of matching product managerial styles with corresponding
portions of product life cycle).
181. The discussion in the text, even though it focuses upon the marketing aspects
of a trademark, is consistent with the typical description of the introduction period.
See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 89-92.
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The next period of sales and gross revenues in a typical product's
life cycle is labelled "Growth." This portion of the curve is the range
of the curve that has a positive slope and demonstrates the most sig-
nificant or dramatic growth in sales and gross revenue. An intuitive
explanation of the growth period centers around the fact that, in this
phase, retailers and consumers are becoming acquainted with the pro-
ducer and its product's brandname,1s" and the producer builds a
favorable reputation.ls" An increasing number of retailers and con-
sumers associate the brandname with a particular source, level of
quality, or stylized image. Consequently, during growth, the rate of
increase in sales and gross revenues is the most dramatic.18
After the growth period, the typical product's life cycle enters into
"Maturity." This portion of the curve is the range where a significant
market presence has been achieved but nowhere do sales and gross
revenues exhibit the significant or dramatic growth that was achieved
during the growth period. If the maturity phase is presented as part of
a smooth and continuous curve, different intuitive explanations
emerge for successful and unsuccessful products.
1. Successful Products
For a successful product, the maturity phase likely will last as long
as gross revenues meet or exceed all costs.1as During this period, the
product has obtained a long-term market presence because a stable
percentage of retailers have developed a preference for the pro-
ducer, 86 and a stable percentage of consumers have developed a pref-
erence for the brandname.'1s Sales and gross revenues may at times
appear random due to a variety of market influences, such as seasonal
182. See id. at 94 (explaining that in growth, "brand loyalty commitment begin[s] to
surface [among] retailers and consumers").
183. See id at 104 (explaining that during growth, "[d]istributor loyalty is important
in light of the fact that the number of distribution outlets will grow rapidly as new-
comers want exposure for their products and pioneering firms want to expand their
markets").
184. Again, the discussion in the text, even though it focuses upon the marketing
aspects of a trademark, is consistent with the typical description of the growth period.
See id at 91, 92-94.
185. See id. at 122 ("A product will continue growing as long as it can attract new
users.").
186. This does not imply, however, that marketing efforts cease at the level where
sales are made to retailers. See Wasson, supra note 141, at 240 ("By this time [matur-
ity] the distributor is as much the target of the promotion as is the final consumer, and
with each changing day he becomes more and more important.").
187. Again, this does not imply and end to marketing. See Wasson, supra note 141,
at 240 (explaining that to maintain a market niche, producers must remind buyers "of
the value of those product attributes which caused him to choose the brand origi-
nally"). Nonetheless, successful products that enter maturity are characterized by sta-
bility. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 94 (noting that the "maturation or
saturation stage can be characterized by a stable sales volume for the industry").
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variations in demand or fluctuations in the price of inputs.'18 As a
first approximation, however, a reasonable forecast is that sales and
gross revenues for the successful product will increase along a linear
path whose rate of growth-the slope of the line-is equal to the rate
of the growth of demand for the product market as a whole.' 8 9 As
long as the market keeps growing and the product is not displaced by
new technology, 190 sales and gross revenue likely will continue to
grow. 9 ' The following graph depicts this predicted life cycle,' z which
is the path labelled "Successful Product":
188. Sales and gross revenues may also appear random due to other influences,
such as interest rates and inflation. See Bowerman & O'Connell, supra note 179, at 8
(A product life cycle "might contain a seasonal component... caused by the obser-
vance of various holidays [such that] department store sales volume might reach high
points in December and April because of shopping for the Christmas and Easter holi-
days."); Bowersox et al., supra note 128, at 209 ("Seasonality is a primary concern for
manufacturers who experience larger than normal sales at certain times of the year or
who have raw materials available for production only at specific times during the
year."); Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 50-52 ("[M]anufacturers and retailers
must be extremely cautious with their inventories under the conditions of high infla-
tion, high interest rates, and excessive credit buying.").
189. See Bowersox et al., supra note 128, at 337 ("At any point in time the market
shares of each participant are based on past differentiation. Those participants not
content with their market shares will enter into a new round of competitive activities
.... "); see also Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 20 (explaining that it is "possible
for a company to grow absolutely in terms of sales volume while losing ground rela-
tively in terms of market share," and citing an example of a personal computer
manufacturer).
190. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 121 ("As long as mature products are
not likely to be replaced by new technologies within the near future, the company
should try to make these products work even harder, thereby extending the mature
portion of their cycle indefinitely.").
191. See id at 120 ("The product does not have to decline; it can become better and
not obviously older."); see also id. at 95 ("Brand loyalty is another important factor,
and if it is strong, it will help extend the maturation stage for a particular firm.").
192. Here as well, the discussion in the text, even though it focuses upon the mar-
keting aspects of a trademark, is consistent with the typical description of the maturity
period. See id. at 91, 94-95.
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Figure 2 also depicts a horizontal line that has important implica-
tions for the introduction and growth periods of a successful product.
This line, labelled "Minimum Level for Profitability," indicates the
minimum sales and gross revenues that must be achieved before a
profitable transaction will take place. When producers build plants
and incur other fixed costs, economies of scale dictate that a minimum
level of operations must be achieved before gross revenues can meet
or exceed all costs.193 Only then will operations yield profitable trans-
actions. Implicit in the horizontal line is the recognition that new pro-
ducers or producers who market new products do not expect to
engage immediately in profitable transactions. 1' Rather, the expecta-
tion is that, during the introduction period and perhaps for much of
193. When initially selecting an optimal scale on which to operate, the producer
needs to be concerned, not just with becoming profitable in the near term, but also
with expanding operations in the long term. See id. at 117 ("This pricing strategy,
lowering price to meet competition but remaining profitable,] was preceded by having
capital improvement and large, efficient facilities.").
194. Manufacturers oftentimes seek to ameliorate the initial losses associated with
the introduction of a new product or product design by charging a higher price. See id.
at 74 ("[P]rice should be set high in the introductory stage because of the small vol-
ume of sales, inefficient production and marketing, frequent product modifications,
few competitors, and a desire to recover research and development costs as soon as
possible in an uncertain market."). This strategy will be effective where those likely
to purchase initially are less price sensitive. See id. at 68 (noting that in the introduc-
tion stage, the producer needs to appeal to "venturesome consumers with above aver-
age status ... [who are] more interested in product benefits than prices."). This
strategy will backfire, however, if the higher price deters consumers from developing
brand loyalty for a new product. See id. at 81 ("Price and innovativeness are nega-
tively related, and high price is a deterrent to adoption.").
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the growth period, no transaction will be profitable, even if the prod-
uct ultimately will be successful.195
2. Unsuccessful Products
For a product that is unsuccessful and for which there was never a
profitable transaction, an intuitive explanation of the maturity phase
is problematic. Indeed, it is oxymoronic to describe an unsuccessful
product as having "matured." It is as though the product never
emerged from the initial stages, during introduction and growth, when
profitable transactions were never expected. 9 6 Operations may have
suffered from production difficulties. Marketing efforts may have
been less than successful."9 The producer may have never established
successful relations with retailers. 98 Consumers may have never asso-
ciated the brandname with a particular source, level of quality, or styl-
ized image. For whatever reason, a minimum level of sales and gross
revenues was not timely achieved to secure a long-term market
presence. 199
The typical depiction, shown in Figure 1, does not forecast much by
way of the pattern of sales or gross revenues for the period after ma-
turity that is labelled "Decline." This portion of the curve is the range
that extends beyond the point where sales and gross revenues begin to
decrease significantly and permanently.200 The standard depiction of
a product's typical life cycle does not indicate the shape of the decline
195. See id at 92 ("Not surprisingly, a loss (rather than a profit) is the rule instead
of an exception in the introduction stage."). These initial and expected losses are, in
effect, fixed costs that must be capitalized and recovered later when transactions be-
come profitable. The need to incur fixed costs at the outset means that, at least in the
beginning of a product's life cycle, profits are no talisman for success. See Bowersox et
al., supra note 128, at 301 (noting that a "major drawback in relying exclusively on
profit as a measure of performance is that the investment required to achieve a given
sales level is not considered").
196. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 98 (noting that "some products may go
directly into the decline stage without going through the maturity stage").
197. For example, a product that enters an established market may encounter sig-
nificantly higher marketing barriers if consumers already have brand loyalty for ex-
isting products. See id. at 34-35 (" 'Me-too' products, especially those which enter the
market late, usually have difficulty in gaining market acceptance.").
198. While one author recognizes that, during maturity, success "requires establish-
ing strong preference at both dealer and consumer levels," Wasson, supra note 141, at
238-40, maintaining ties at the dealer level may be most important: "With buyers now
less avid and more critical, the slow moving brands begin to disappear from the
shelves, and dealer ties start to become the major factor in competitive strength." Id.
at 240.
199. Of course, the reasons for product failure to go beyond the ones suggested in
the text, and some products seem doomed to failure, even if attached to a strong and
valuable trademark. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 30 (discussing products
abandoned early in development, including ketchup-flavored ice cream, chocolate
hair-styling gel, and parsnip chips).
200. For a discussion of the reasons why a firm should delete a product instead of
trying to revive it, see id. at 129-30.
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period. An intuitive explanation would not suggest that sales and rev-
enues drop to zero immediately.2 1' In the decline phase, the producer
and its retailers likely terminate production and marketing operations
in as orderly a fashion as possible.2"2 Marketing does not cease, but
the producer and the retailers who carry the product gradually curtail
promotional efforts until the last of the inventory is sold.20 3 As a first
approximation, a reasonable forecast is that the sales and gross reve-
nues during the decline period will be symmetrical with those of the
introduction and growth periods.2 4 This predicted life cycle would
follow the path in Figure 2 that is labelled "Unsuccessful Product."'2"s
The two patterns of sales and gross revenues in Figure 2 allow a
comparison of the differences between the likely life cycles of success-
ful and unsuccessful products. The successful product timely achieved
the minimum level of profitability, and sales and gross revenues con-
tinue to grow at a rate that mirrors the growth of the product market
as a whole. The unsuccessful product, by contrast, did not timely
achieve the minimum level of profitability, and sales and gross reve-
nues decline to zero after the producer and retailers wind up their
operations. Other comparisons can be made as well. The introduc-
tion period for the unsuccessful product took longer and resulted in
less of a market presence in terms of the level of sales and gross reve-
nues. The growth period for the unsuccessful product also exhibits
lower rates of growth and also resulted in less of a market presence.
201. See id. at 96 (noting that during decline, consumers "tend to be brand loyal"
and, towards end, "only a few specialized firms choose to remain").
202. Indeed, one recommended strategy during the decline period is to minimize
any adverse impact on market participants:
Product lines should be reduced because market segmentation is no longer a
necessity. This does not mean that a declining product should be automati-
cally deleted, but instead that a product should be retained as long as it still
contributes something to the firm's overall fixed costs. Also, any product
withdrawal should not be so abrupt as to leave distributors and customers
vulnerable; otherwise, hard-earned good will and future cooperation may be
lost.
Id at 107; see also id. at 130-31 (discussing need for orderly and gradual deletion of a
product to maintain good will with retailers and consumers); Wasson, supra note 141,
at 223 (explaining that the process during decline should be "that of milking the mar-
ket and withdrawing both physical and managerial resources which can yield greater
profits elsewhere, while supplying whatever market remains to be served at a profit").
203. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 131 ("A manufacturer must keep on
advertising its withdrawn product in order to move the [already manufactured] inven-
tory for itself as well as for its dealers.").
204. If so, the complete life cycle would resemble a bell curve. Of course, there are
a variety of nonlinear curves that could be used to forecast a smooth yet nonsymetri-
cal path during the decline period that is consistent with discussion in the text.
205. Once again, the discussion in the text, even though it focuses upon the market-
ing aspects of a trademark, is consistent with the typical description of the decline
period. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 91, 95-96.
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B. The Role of Trademarks in Product Success
The discussion of the life cycles of products that meet with different
success in the market suggests how better marketing tools, such as
better established and stronger trademarks, enhance a product's sales
and gross revenues. °6 To isolate the effects of using a trademark that
is a better marketing tool, consider two producers, each with success-
ful products. Both producers have the same size plants that produce
products with equal efficiency. Both products have the same level of
quality207 and stylized image.208 The only difference is the brandname
that each producer selected. 0 9 The life cycles for both products are
depicted in Figure 3. Of course, the more successful product is associ-
ated with the life cycle that, at all times, has higher sales and gross
revenues.
206. One example of how a trademark can lead to higher profits is the development
of brandnames by agricultural co-operatives. Where agricultural commodities remain
undifferentiated, there is little pricing flexibility or opportunity to engage in premium
pricing. Where agricultural co-operatives differentiate their members products "[b]y
building brand name recognition, most major co-ops can pay their member farmers
more than the market price for their crops." See id. at 9 (citing example of Blue Dia-
mond Growers and its line of flavored almonds).
207. Even for a product that is differentiated because it enjoys an initial technologi-
cal advantage, there is still a need to develop a brandname that will differentiate the
product after others develop the same technological advantage. See id. at 150 ("A
product, whenever possible, should be branded and promoted as a premium product
with a high-quality image, since this is likely to offer better profit margins and protec-
tion from competitive efforts.").
208. Here, "stylized image" refers to psychological attributes conveyed by the func-
tional aspects of the products, but not psychological attributes conveyed by the
brandname or other marketing efforts.
209. Except for the brandnames, both products are akin to generic products. To
achieve relative success, one of the products must do more: "[A] generic product is
primarily preoccupied with the physical configuration and explicit performance. Stra-
tegic market advantage, however, can only be achieved by endowing the product with
greater benefits." Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 6. Here, the brandname is that
something more through which each producer seeks to gain a strategic advantage with
the benefit of a favorable marketing message. An example of how different market-
ing success is linked to different brandnames is laundry detergent where, for example,
one firm may market the same product under different brandnames. Id. at 12 ("The
company [Proctor & Gamble] has done a good job of endowing each brand with a
unique personality (image) even though these brands are not chemically different.").
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Consistent with the discussion thus far, Figure 3 suggests intuitive
explanations for the greater success of the product whose brandname
is a better marketing tool.21 In the introduction period, the better
brandname had greater success in conveying to retailers a level of
quality or stylized image that was likely to generate retail profits.21'
Consequently, more retailers selected and featured that product. To
the extent that consumers shop by choosing an outlet and then
purchase products carried by the retailer, sales and gross revenues
were higher. The more successful brandname also better enabled con-
sumers to begin to associate the product with a favorable marketing
message. To the extent that consumers shop by choosing particular
brands of a product without regard to the outlet, sales and gross reve-
nues were higher for this additional reason. Because of the better
brandname, sales and gross revenues increased at a faster rate and
produced a greater market presence in a shorter period of time.212
210. The observation, in the text, that firms compete through brandnames, is hardly
novel See id at 152 (citing examples of brandname competition in "strategies...
used successfully by many domestic manufacturers as a defense against apparel im-
ports"); Wasson, supra note 141, at 245 (noting that in the food and drug area, "less
than one 'new product' in one hundred is a category introduction. The rest are all
some form of brand introduction"); Porter, supra note 132, at 489 (defining "brands
that match the product characteristics or brand positionings [of the competitor as]
blocking or fighting brands").
211. Sometimes, this kind of advantage accrues to the first firm to market a particu-
lar kind of product. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 150 ("The innovator has a
promotional advantage since the innovator is in a position to select the proper prod-
uct positioning strategy while having time to build brand awareness.").
212. See Wasson, supra note 141, at 244 (explaining that "the strong brand carves
out a strong niche-a substantial market share-early or not at all, and that its growth
attracts emulators quickly").
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The greater benefits of the successful product's brandname contin-
ued to produce a superior marketing performance during the growth
period. The higher level of sales not only better enabled retailers to
become acquainted with the producer who is building a favorable rep-
utation more quickly, but also led retailers to purchase more of the
product and, perhaps, to increase promotional efforts.213 In addition,
the better brandname had greater success in enabling consumers to
associate the product with a favorable marketing message and to
make those associations more quickly. The relative success during the
growth period mirrors the success achieved during introduction. Be-
cause of the better brandname, sales and gross revenues increased at a
faster rate and produced a greater market presence in a shorter period
of time.214
Even though both products timely achieved a minimum level of
sales and gross revenues to assure long-term profitability, the better
brandname led to a greater market presence during maturity.215 Each
brandname became a valuable marketing asset. A stable percentage
of retailers developed a preference for each producer, and a stable
percentage of consumers developed a preference for each brandname.
The difference is that the better brandname is a more valuable mar-
keting asset.216 A higher percentage of retailers select and feature the
product with the better brandname, and a higher percentage of con-
sumers purchase the product with the better brandname. In effect,
the product with the better brandname is more successful because the
better brandname boosted that product into a greater market share.21 7
213. Of course, it has long been recognized that retailers will not promote products
unless they can recover the costs of promotional activities. Lester G. Telser, Why
Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & Econ. 86 (1960). Thus, a retailer is
not likely to increase promotional efforts without reasonable assurances that the
product will generate sufficient revenues. As argued in the text, one of those assur-
ances is an initial rate of growth in sales and gross revenues which signals that the
product is destined for success.
214. See Wasson, supra note 141, at 238. As Wasson states:
Only by finishing the growth period well in front of competition, with a
greater accumulation of experience, can a seller be assured of the chance for
the optimum market and profit position through the remainder of the prod-
uct life cycle or even of a high probability of survival in the competitive
shakeout of the period of turbulence which follows.
Id.
215. Even after a product reaches maturity, a brandname that differentiates the
product can help to preserve or perhaps to increase market share. See Onkvisit &
Shaw, supra note 49, at 105-06 (citing the orange juice market as an example of new
brandnames segmenting a market).
216. The suggestion, in the text, that a brandname can be responsible for the rela-
tive success of a product is hardly novel. See id. at 155 ("Consumers may prefer the
prestige of Gucci and Izod LaCoste even though these brands are not necessarily
superior to many alternatives when compared on the basis of objective criteria.").
217. Indeed, the marketing difficulties of introducing a new brandname, in some
contexts, may resemble the marketing difficulties of introducing a new product de-
sign. See id. at 73-74 (noting that the problems of marketing a new brand resemble the
problems of marketing a product innovation, and citing the example of a new brand
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Another and significant benefit of a better brandname is the costs
that are avoided because the product more quickly attained a mini-
mum level of sales and gross revenues to assure long-term profitabil-
ity. Producers do not expect to profit on initial transactions during
introduction and growth. Producers expect to incur costs that current
revenues will not cover. These initial costs, to the extent not recov-
ered through current revenues, must be capitalized as fixed costs and
recovered later when transactions become profitable.218 Conse-
quently, by reducing initial losses, producers benefit by, in effect, re-
ducing fixed costs that must be recovered over time. Even if two
products ultimately have the same market share, one product has a
better brandname if that brandname led to profitability more quickly
and, thereby, avoided losses that must be capitalized as fixed costs.
The benefit of avoiding losses that must be capitalized as fixed costs
is represented graphically on Figure 3. The minimum level for profit-
ability approximates the costs, both fixed and variable, that must be
recovered in each time period. The initial losses are represented by
the area to the left of the point where a product reaches the minimum
level of profitability and is bounded by that minimum level on top and
the path of sales and gross revenues on the bottom. The product with
the better brandname has a smaller area and, consequently, fewer
losses that must be capitalized as fixed costs. The relative advantage
of the better brandname is the difference between the areas for each
product or, more directly, the area bounded by the minimum level on
top and the two paths of sales and gross revenues on either side. The
producer with the better brandname obtained this relative advantage
by more quickly developing a strong trademark as a valuable market-
ing asset.2
19
of low-tar cigarette). Consequently, the marketing success of a better brandname
may resemble the marketing success of a better product design.
218. An intuitive understanding of losses that are capitalized as fixed costs can be
found in the example of a loan obtained to cover operational losses. Of course, busi-
nesses often finance fixed costs, such as building a new plant, by taking out a loan.
The fixed costs are capitalized because the business can, for example, finance the
current costs of a new plant by spreading the payments for the new plant over time.
Consider a business whose revenues do not cover all costs but which must finance
those costs when they are incurred. The business may borrow funds to finance cur-
rent operational losses just as it borrowed funds to build a new plant. And, in the
same sense that the fixed costs of the plant were capitalized, operational losses are
capitalized because the business finances the current costs of operational losses by
spreading the payments for those losses over time.
219. Of course, the relative benefit of avoiding losses that must be capitalized as
fixed costs is offset to the extent that the trademark holder incurs costs to develop the
brandname into a strong trademark. Developing a better marketing tool, such as a
better established and stronger trademark, is not a costless activity. Thus, a competi-
tor who incurs greater fixed costs to develop a better trademark, has greater fixed
costs that must be capitalized and recovered over time.
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C. The Life Cycle of an Infringing Product
The life cycle of an infringing product will not likely follow the
smooth and continuous path of any of the successful or unsuccessful
products depicted above. For an infringing product, a disruption or
shock to the path occurs when the trademark holder files an action for
infringement, establishes liability, obtains injunctive relief, and forces
the infringer to discontinue using the infringing brandname. Follow-
ing that disruption, the infringer suffers a temporary setback while
shifting to a new and dissimilar brandname. Once production resumes
with new labels and packaging, the product continues along a path of
gross sales and revenues. Because the product now bears a new
brandname, however, the rate of growth of sales and gross revenues
for the new path likely differs from the path of the product with the
infringing brandname.
Figures 4 and 5 depict two likely paths for infringing products-
Figure 4 depicts one for a product that became successful after adopt-
ing a new and clearly dissimilar brandname, and Figure 5 depicts one
for a product that did not. The first vertical line indicates the time
when the infringer discontinues using the infringing brandname.
Thus, Figures 4 and 5 depict the hypothetical illustration introduced
earlier, at least insofar as infringement ceased before the hypothetical
infringer became profitable. ° The second vertical line indicates the
time when the infringer's product starts on a new path after adopting
a noninfringing alternative. The drop in sales and gross revenues be-
tween the two vertical lines represents the temporary setback that the
infringer suffers when shifting to the new and dissimilar brandname.
In these respects as well, Figures 4 and 5 depict the hypothetical illus-
tration introduced earlier.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
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Two aspects of Figures 4 and 5 provide graphical representations of
points made earlier. One concerns the location of the effective point
of sale. As noted earlier, to the extent that consumers shop by select-
ing an outlet and then purchasing products that the retailer carries,
the effective point of sale is at the level where sales are made to retail-
ers. Here, the temporary setback of shifting to the noninfringing
brandname is least likely to affect the infringer. Although the infring-
ing brandname enhanced opportunities to develop long-term relations
with retailers, once those relations are established, the favorable repu-
tation resides more in the personal reputation or personality of the
producer than in the brandname. Consequently, to the extent that the
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effective point of sale is to retailers, that should reduce the drop in
sales and gross revenues during the temporary setback.
A greater setback is likely if the effective point of sale is at the level
where sales are made to consumers. To the extent that consumers
shop by selecting particular brands of a product without regard to the
outlet, the effective point of sale is to the consumer. Here, the benefit
of infringing an established and strong trademark is that consumers
will more readily associate the product with a particular source, level
of quality, or stylized image. Those favorable associations reside in
the successful trademark that was infringed. Those associations do
not transfer to a new and dissimilar brandname. In effect, the in-
fringer must start anew in developing a brandname that signals a
favorable marketing message to consumers. Consequently, to the ex-
tent that the effective point of sale is to consumers, that should in-
crease the drop in sales and gross revenues during the temporary
setback.
Another point made earlier that is represented on Figures 4 and 5
concerns the relative rates of growth in sales and gross revenues
before and after the temporary setback. Whether the infringement
was knowing or innocent, the infringer initially adopted the infringing
brandname to obtain marketing benefits. As noted earlier, those ben-
efits include enhanced opportunities to develop long-term relations
with retailers, to signal a favorable marketing message to consumers,
and to reach the minimum level of profitability more quickly. The
reason the infringer initially adopted the infringing brandname was
that the infringing brandname was the best alternative to obtain these
benefits.22' At least at the outset, the infringing brandname was a bet-
ter marketing tool than alternatives, including the noninfringing alter-
native subsequently adopted.
Given that the infringer adopted the infringing brandname because
it was the best perceived alternative, the infringer should have a lower
rate of growth in sales and gross revenue after adopting the nonin-
fringing brandname. The differences between the infringing
brandname and the noninfringing alternative mirror the differences,
discussed above, between two successful products, one of which had a
better brandname. There, the product with the better brandname had
a faster rate of growth. Here, because the infringing brandname was
adopted instead of alternatives, the infringing brandname is likely the
better brandname associated with a faster rate of growth. Conversely,
the noninfringing brandname is likely associated with a slower rate of
growth. To show how these different rates of growth can be used to
measure the gains of the infringer, the discussion will next explore
221. Cf Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir.
1994) ("Quaker was in need of a new marketing approach... [and] had considered
the proposed advertising campaign based on the [infringing] Thirst-Aid mark to be
superior to the alternatives.").
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how to estimate the revenues the infringer would have earned had a
noninfringing brandname been used from the outset.
IV. CALCULATING THE INFRINGER'S GAINS
The rationales of deterring infringement and preventing unjust en-
richment are not served if an infringer can benefit from unauthorized
use without paying damages. These rationales would be served, even
if only indirectly, if existing damage remedies resulted in monetary
relief whenever an infringer gains. That is not the case, however.
Where infringement does not injure the trademark holder, compensa-
tory approaches afford no monetary relief. Where infringement does
not lead to profitable transactions during the period of infringement,
an accounting of profits affords no monetary relief. Where, however,
an infringer benefits from unauthorized use without injuring the
trademark holder or profiting during the period of infringement, a
more comprehensive approach is needed to measure the gains of
trademark infringement. 222
A. Formulating a New Approach
A more comprehensive approach begins by re-examining the tradi-
tional limitations on an accounting of profits. One is that the gains of
trademark infringement are measured from the time the infringer
learns that the brandname infringes. Where an infringer later
switches to a dissimilar brandname, the switch confirms that nonin-
fringing alternatives were available. Even where an infringer does not
switch to a dissimilar brandname but opts instead to discontinue oper-
ations, it stretches credulity too far to argue that a noninfringing alter-
native was not available. Whether the infringement was knowing or
innocent, the infringer declined either to use a known alternative or to
investigate potential alternatives.' Presumably, the infringer
thought that known alternatives were less desirable marketing tools.
Or, perhaps the infringer thought that the costs of selecting and de-
signing a potential alternative would not be offset by increased mar-
keting benefits.
222. Even if a reasonable royalty is awarded, there is no assurance that the trade-
mark infringer might nonetheless gain from unauthorized use. Indeed, the method
for calculating a reasonable royalty is geared to measure a fair rate of return on the
value of the trademark, usually measured in terms of a percentage of gross revenues.
A reasonable royalty typically is not measured in terms of a percentage of profits.
Thus, if the reasonable royalty is less than, for example, the losses that the infringer
avoided, the infringer will nonetheless gain.
223. In one case involving a trademark protected by the Amateur Sports Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-606, 92 Stat. 3045, the court bolstered its finding of the defend-
ants' wrongful intent to infringe by noting that the defendants had alternatives, even
though the court did not specifically identify those alternatives. United States
Olympic Comm. v. Union Sport Apparel, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 526, 530 (E.D. Va.
1983) (noting the defendants' "complete freedom to choose any marks").
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The rationale of deterring infringement suggests that the gains of
trademark infringement should be measured from the initial choice of
the infringing brandname and not a later time when the infringer
learns that the brandname infringes." When the infringer made the
initial choice of a brandname, the task of avoiding infringement was
not monumental. A simple trademark search would likely have
alerted the infringer of the potential to infringe.225 Moreover, the cost
of a trademark search is modest, especially when placed in contrast to
the costs of producing and distributing the product to which the in-
fringing brandname is affixed. Thus, the deterrence rationale is
served not only by providing incentives to avoid knowing infringe-
ment, but also by providing incentives to undertake trademark
searches and other investigations to avoid innocent infringement.
The rationale of preventing unjust enrichment also suggests that the
gains of trademark infringement should be measured from the initial
choice of the infringing brandname and not a later time when the in-
fringer learns that the brandname infringes. An infringer is enriched
through a greater market presence and increased sales and gross reve-
nues, regardless of whether infringement is knowing or innocent.
Moreover, the fact that the infringer could have chosen a noninfring-
ing alternative provides a strong argument that retention of those ben-
efits is unjust. Thus, the unjust enrichment rationale is served not only
by depriving the infringer of gains during knowing infringement, but
also by depriving the infringer of gains made when noninfringing al-
ternatives might have been explored and chosen.
A more comprehensive approach should also re-examine the tradi-
tional limitation that the gains of trademark infringement are not
measured beyond the time when infringement ceases. As the preced-
ing discussion has urged, the gains of infringement will differ, depend-
ing upon the extent to which the effective point of sale is at the level
where sales are made to consumers or to retailers. To the extent that
the effective point of sale is to consumers, the gains of infringement
likely end when infringement ceases. The favorable associations sig-
nalled by the infringing brandname reside in the trademark and, thus,
do not transfer to a dissimilar brandname. To the extent that the ef-
fective point of sale is to retailers, however, the gains of infringement
224. Today, courts recognize, at least with respect to an accounting that is author-
ized by § 35(a), that there is no impediment to relaxing the limitation that restricts an
accounting to the period of knowing infringement. See Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co.,
Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Other than general equitable considerations,
there is no express requirement that.., the infringer wilfully infringe the trade dress
to justify an award of profits."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990).
225. A failure to conduct a trademark search or to consult trademark counsel are
factors that courts have noted when finding infringement and awarding an accounting
of profits. Masterpiece of Pa., Inc. v. Consolidated Novelty Co., Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding that, although the defendant knew of the
plaintiff's use of a similar trademark, it neither made a trademark search nor con-
sulted counsel).
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likely continue after infringement ceases. The marketing asset of es-
tablished relations with retailers resides in the personal reputation or
personality of the infringer, not the infringing brandname.
The rationale of deterring infringement suggests that the measure-
ment of the gains of trademark infringement should not presumptively
end when infringement ceases. The deterrence rationale is best served
by depriving infringers of all the gains of infringement.' Unauthor-
ized use creates enhanced opportunities during infringement to gain a
market presence by establishing favorable relations with retailers.
Where the effective point of sale is to retailers, relations likely will
continue after infringement ceases. The gains of infringement thus ex-
tend beyond infringement as retailers continue to select and feature
the infringer's product, even though a different brandname is affixed
to that product. To deprive infringers of all the gains of infringement,
the measurement of those gains should not presumptively end when
infringement ceases.
The rationale of preventing unjust enrichment also suggests that the
measurement of the gains of trademark infringement should not pre-
sumptively end when the infringement ceases. To the extent that the
effective point of sale is to retailers, increased sales and gross revenues
flow from favorable relations that persuade retailers to select and fea-
ture a product. Indeed, established relations with retailers are valua-
ble marketing assets, and any unauthorized use that enhances those
relations enriches the infringer as much as profits on sales that are
diverted during infringement enrich the infringer. The difference is
that favorable relations create a market presence from which benefits
linger after infringement ceases. If unauthorized use can produce un-
just enrichments during infringement, the benefits of unauthorized use
that are realized after infringement ceases are no less enriching and no
less unjust.
A final limitation that a more comprehensive approach should re-
examine is the one that restricts the measurement of gains of trade-
mark infringement to only profitable transactions. Producers do not
expect that every transaction will be profitable. To the contrary, the
typical expectation for a new product is that transactions will not be-
come profitable until the producer reaches a minimum level of opera-
tions.' 7 During this time of introduction and growth, however,
trademark infringement may increase sales and gross revenues. In-
fringement may thus help the infringer to reach profitability more
226. Again, this shows why a reasonable royalty is not a viable alternative, at least
insofar as monetary relief should serve the deterrence rationale. See supra notes 87 &
222.
227. Similarly, where sales and gross revenues are subject to seasonal fluctuations,
the typical expectation may be that transactions during some marketing periods will
not be profitable. Here as well, trademark infringement may not only increase sales
during profitable periods, but also avoid greater losses during unprofitable periods.
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quickly, resulting in fewer losses that must be capitalized as fixed costs
to be recovered later. Even if the infringer never reaches profitability,
unauthorized use may allow the infringer to avoid still greater losses.
The rationale of deterring infringement suggests that the measure-
ment of the gains of trademark infringement should not be restricted
to profitable transactions. Again, the deterrence rationale is best
served by depriving infringers of all of the gains of infringement. An
infringer need not profit to gain from unauthorized use. Financial
benefits flow from avoiding losses that must be capitalized as fixed
costs as much as they flow from profits on diverted sales. The gains of
infringement are not inexorably linked to profitable transactions, but
extend, instead, to all sales and gross revenues that were enhanced by
unauthorized use. To deprive infringers of all of the gains of infringe-
ment, the measurement of those gains should not be limited to profit-
able transactions.
The rationale of preventing unjust enrichment also suggests that the
measurement of the gains of trademark infringement should not be
restricted to profitable transactions. Increased sales and gross reve-
nues enrich the infringer, regardless of whether those increased bene-
fits come in form of transactions that are profitable or unprofitable.
In both, increased revenues defray costs and avoid even greater finan-
cial losses. The difference is that the increased revenues on unprofita-
ble transactions defray fewer costs, and thus do not avoid all losses. If
unauthorized use can produce unjust enrichments from increased rev-
enues on profitable transactions, the benefits of unauthorized use that
are realized on unprofitable transactions are no less enriching and no
less unjust.
The traditional limitations on an accounting restrict the measure-
ment of the infringer's gains to profits during the period of knowing
infringement and, in so doing, actually create perverse incentives to
infringe. An infringer who does not compete directly with the trade-
mark holder" 8 or injure the trademark holder's goodwill can avoid
compensatory damages. That same infringer can avoid damages
under an accounting by discontinuing the unauthorized use before
transactions become profitable. In these situations, unauthorized use
nonetheless helped to increase sales and gross revenues that, in turn,
defrayed still greater losses, even though there were no profitable
transactions during the period of knowing infringement. So too, un-
authorized use helped to obtain the marketing asset of established re-
lations with retailers that led to a greater market presence, even
though there were no profitable transactions during the period of
knowing infringement.
228. Thus, the infringer follows a strategy that some trademark holders employ to
exploit strong and valuable trademarks more fully. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note
49, at 124 ("Brand extension is the strategy to extend a brand, usually a popular one,
by putting the name on new products.").
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B. Benefiting Throughout the Life Cycle
A more comprehensive approach should expand beyond the narrow
focus of an accounting and measure benefits that may accrue through-
out the life cycle of the infringer's product. The infringer obtained
these benefits by initially choosing the infringing brandname as the
best available marketing tool. Put another way, if the infringer
gained, the life cycle of the infringing product should exhibit higher
sales and gross revenues than an estimated life cycle would if the non-
infringing alternative had been used from the outset. Otherwise, the
infringer would have opted initially for the noninfringing alternative.
This suggests three scenarios which illustrate the gains of trademark
infringement, depending upon first, whether the infringer's product is
ultimately successful, and second, whether an estimated path for the
noninfringing alternative would have been successful.'
1. Actual and Estimated Life Cycles Successful
In the first scenario, the actual path of sales and gross revenues
timely achieves a minimum level of profitability to secure a long-term
market presence. So too, the estimated path of sales and gross reve-
nues for the noninfringing alternative, if it had been used from the
outset, would have achieved a minimum level of profitability to secure
a long-term market presence. The difference is that, because the ac-
tual path reflects the use of the infringing brandname during introduc-
tion and growth, the actual path has a life cycle that, at all times, has
higher sales and gross revenues. This situation is depicted in Figure 6:
229. Mxing the two distinctions suggests four cases that are conceptually possible,
but the discussion in the text omits the one that would not result in a gain to the
infringer-when the actual path of sales and gross revenues is ultimately unsuccessful
but the estimated path of sales and gross revenues is ultimately successful. This scena-
rio suggests that, if the noninfringing alternative had been used from the outset, the
infringer would have had a life cycle that, at all times, had higher sales and gross
revenues. In other words, this scenario suggests that the infringing brandname was
not a better marketing tool, and the infringer did not gain from infringement. Here,
because the market will discipline infringement, the market deters infringement and
prevents the infringer from becoming enriched through unauthorized use.
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By now, the intuitive explanation of this scenario should be appar-
ent. At the outset, the infringer presumably chose the infringing
brandname because it appeared to be a better marketing tool. During
infringement, use of the infringing brandname resulted in a higher
rate of growth in sales and gross revenues. The benefits of the higher
rate of growth include revenues that increased more than they would
have had the noninfringing alternative been used from the outset. A
related benefit is that, because initial losses were lowered, fewer losses
need to be capitalized as fixed costs and recovered later. Finally, use
of the infringing brandname enhanced opportunities to establish long-
term relations with retailers, a benefit that is reflected in the higher
market presence when infringement ceased.
After infringement, during the temporary setback, benefits con-
tinue. Infringement helped the infringer achieve a market presence,
even if not yet at the minimum level for profitable transactions. While
shifting to the noninfringing alternative, the infringer did not need to
start anew because the infringer did not lose all of that market pres-
ence. This boost likely resulted because, in significant respects, the
effective point of sale is to the retailer.20 The benefits of favorable
230. Of course, other explanations are plausible. For example, the infringer might
be marketing a new kind of product, and the infringing brandname helped to create
generic demand among consumers as opposed to brand-specific demand. Here, the
effective point of sale may be to the consumer, but the infringer nonetheless received
a boost and did not need to start anew for the simple reason that substitute products
might not yet be available from competitors. See supra note 138 (noting different
marketing strategies aimed at generating generic demand or brand-specified de-
mand). Moreover, if the infringer followed a strategy of charging a high initial price
to offset initial losses, the infringer who subsequently charges a lower price to attract
price sensitive customers may wish to discard an initial brandname that consumers
associate with the initial, high price. See supra note 194 (explaining that the strategy
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relations with retailers reside in the personal reputation or personality
of the infringer and continue after the change in the brandname. Be-
cause of the boost from better relations with retailers, revenues during
the temporary setback continue higher than they would have had the
noninfringing alternative been used from the outset, resulting in fewer
losses that must be capitalized as fixed costs.231
After the infringer adopts a noninfringing brandname, the benefits
of infringement continue. The life cycle for the infringer's product
timely achieves a minimum level of profitability and secures a long-
term market presence. Not all of this success, however, can be attrib-
uted to the new brandname. Certainly, the noninfringing alternative,
if used from the outset, would have achieved a long-term market pres-
ence. But because of the boost in market presence achieved during
infringement, the infringer achieved an even greater market presence
after infringement. The minimum level of profitability was reached
sooner, resulting in fewer losses that are capitalized as fixed costs.
And, sales and gross revenues continue higher than had the nonin-
fringing alternative been used from the outset.
This first scenario demonstrates how current damage remedies po-
tentially create perverse incentives to infringe. Consider a nefarious
competitor who wants to exploit another's strong trademark. The in-
fringer selects a market in which the trademark holder does not com-
pete and produces a product of the same level of quality or stylized
image. This reduces the risk of compensatory damages for diverted
sales or injury to goodwill. Then, the infringer highlights the infring-
ing brandname when convincing retailers to select and feature the
product. This exploits the trademark's value to develop a marketing
asset that will reside in the personality and personal reputation of the
infringer. Finally, the infringer shifts to a dissimilar brandname just
before sales become profitable. 232 This avoids damages under an ac-
counting of profits which are limited to profitable transactions during
the period of infringement. In this scenario, the infringer knowingly
of charging a high initial price was effective where consumers were less price
sensitive).
231. Of course, the heuristic example in the text is not meant to preclude other
possibilities. For example, it is possible that on the facts of a particular scenario, a
temporary setback will be so severe that the actual path dips below the path formed
had the noninfringing brandname been used from the outset. Such an occurrence
would not detract from the central argument of this Article: Trademark infringers
potentially benefit from unauthorized use, even if infringers do not engage in profita-
ble transactions during the period of knowing infringement.
232. If the competitor truly is nefarious and responding to perverse incentives to
infringe, the competitor might plan for the shift in ways that reduce the temporary
setback. For example, the competitor might already have new labels and packaging
for the noninfringing alternative. And, the competitor may have already alerted re-
tailers of the impending shift and, perhaps, advertised the new brandname to
consumers.
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infringed and benefited, but current damage remedies do not deprive
the infringer of the gains of trademark infringement.2 33
2. Actual and Estimated Life Cycles Unsuccessful
In the second scenario, the actual path of sales and gross revenues
did not timely achieve a minimum level of profitability to secure a
long-term market presence. If the noninfringing alternative had been
used from the outset, the estimated path of sales and gross revenues
would also have failed to achieve a minimum level of profitability to
secure a long-term market presence. In this situation as in the first,
the difference is that, because the actual path reflects the use of the
infringing brandname during introduction and growth, the actual path
has a life cycle that, at all times, has higher sales and gross revenues.
This is depicted in Figure 7:
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A different intuitive explanation emerges for this second case, but
the differences are not so much in the period of infringement. Here as
well, the infringer initially chose the infringing brandname because it
appeared a better marketing tool. The higher rate of growth during
infringement resulted in higher sales and gross revenues, fewer losses
that are capitalized as fixed costs, and better relations with retailers
that create a greater market presence. Even though the product ulti-
233. Once again, a reasonable royalty would deprive the infringer of some, but not
all, of the gains. See supra notes 87 & 222. In fact, a radically different method of
calculating a royalty would be necessary to capture gains that are realized after in-
fr-ingement ceases. The royalty would have to be set to capitalize the benefits
throughout the life cycle and not just a fair rate of return for using the trademark
during the period of knowing infringement.
TRADEMARK GAINS
mately was not successful, unauthorized use allowed the infringer to
avoid even greater financial losses during the period of infringement.
For the second scenario, the different explanation begins to emerge
after infringement and during the temporary setback. When shifting
to the noninfringing brandname, the infringer does not need to start
anew, but the market presence achieved during infringement does not
boost the product to the minimum level of profitability. Perhaps the
infringer's relations with retailers was not sufficiently established to
assure long-term success. The setback more likely resulted because, in
significant respects, the effective point of sale is to consumers?3 The
benefits of infringing are the favorable associations signalled to con-
sumers by the infringing brandname. Those favorable associations re-
side in the trademark and do not transfer to the noninfringing
alternative. Thus, the market presence achieved during infringement
is mostly lost during the temporary setback.
After the infringer adopts a noninfringing brandname, the benefits
of infringement continue, even though the infringer's product ulti-
mately is unsuccessful. Of course, the lack of success derives princi-
pally from the noninfringing alternative that the infringer
subsequently chose. This alternative, if used from the outset, would
not have achieved a long-term market presence. The important point,
however, is that the noninfringing alternative would have resulted in
fewer sales and gross revenues throughout the life cycle. The nonin-
fringing alternative would have resulted in greater financial losses.
The benefits of infringement that are realized after infringement are
the even greater financial losses that would have been suffered had
infringement never occurred."3
This second scenario also demonstrates potentially perverse incen-
tives to infringe. This time, the nefarious competitor wants to enter a
market that is characterized by high risk.236 Trademark infringement
offers a strategy to reduce the adverse financial impact if the product
fails. 37 To avoid compensatory damages, the infringer selects the
trademark of a producer who does not compete and produces a prod-
uct of the same level of quality or stylized image. To avoid damages
234. Another plausible explanation is that, even if the effective point of sale is to
retailers, the period of infringement was too short for the infringer to establish a
favorable reputation with retailers.
235. This consideration suggests a limit on damage calculations that falls short of
the entire life cycle of the infringer's product. The benefit of avoiding even greater
financial losses theoretically ends when the estimated life cycle of the noninfringing
alternative ends. At this point, if infringement never occurred, the infringer would
have ceased operations and avoided financial losses altogether.
236. In fact, significant risks seem to accompany the introduction of any new prod-
uct, even if by a successful competitor. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 113
("Given the generally poor survival record of new products along with the huge in-
vestment associated with their introduction, there is great risk in playing pioneer.")
237. See id. at 35 (explaining that risk minimization is a criterion in new product
selection and development.).
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under an accounting, the infringer shifts to a dissimilar brandname
before transactions become profitable. Even if transactions never be-
come profitable, the infringing use will increase sales and gross reve-
nues, thereby decreasing financial losses and reducing the adverse
impact of a failed product. Infringement thus lowers risk. In this sce-
nario as well, the infringer knowingly infringed and benefited, but cur-
rent damage remedies do not deprive the infringer of the gains of
trademark infringement.3a
3. Actual Life Cycle Successful; Estimated Unsuccessful
The third scenario presents the most extreme situation. Here, the
actual path of sales and gross revenues timely achieves a minimum
level of profitability to secure a long-term market presence. Had the
noninfringing alternative been used from the outset, however, the esti-
mated path of sales and gross revenues would have failed to achieve a
minimum level of profitability to secure a long-term market presence.
The difference, once again, starts during introduction and growth
where the actual path reflects the use of the infringing brandname.
The effect is the most extreme because the infringer's success appears
to derive solely from trademark infringement. This situation is de-
picted in Figure 8:
238. Here as well, a reasonable royalty would deprive the infringer of some, but not
all, of the gains unless the royalty were set to capitalize the benefits throughout the
life cycle and not just during the period of knowing infringement. See supra note 233.
In addition, in this case, it is not altogether clear that a license would have been forth-
coming in the first place, especially in light of the high degree of risk that character-
izes the market. The trademark holder who owns a strong and valuable trademark
may not want the risk of attaching the mark to a product that may likely fail. Conse-
quently, any attempt at calculating a reasonable royalty likely is speculative.
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During infringement, the benefits in the third scenario mirror those
in the first and second. The infringer initially chose the infringing
brandname because it appeared a better marketing tool. Sales and
gross revenues increased at a faster rate than had the noninfringing
alternative been used. The resulting benefits include increased sales
and gross revenues, fewer losses that are capitalized as fixed costs, and
greater opportunities to establish favorable relations with retailers.
The product ultimately was successful, but here that success is due
solely to the market presence that was gained during infringement.
After infringement, during the temporary setback, the significant
difference is the boost that helped the infringer achieve a market pres-
ence. Here, the finding of infringement and the subsequent shift to
the noninfringing alternative least affect the relationships the infringer
established with successful retailers. Perhaps the trademark holder
did not have strong incentives to file actions against retailers. The
boost more likely resulted because, in all significant respects, the ef-
fective point of sale is to retailers133 9 Infringement enhanced the op-
portunities to establish a favorable reputation in terms, such as
prompt shipments or flexible payment terms, that do not reside in the
infringing brandname. Consequently, the market presence achieved
during infringement in the third scenario provides the most pro-
nounced boost and opportunities for post-infringement benefits.
The life cycle for the infringer's product achieves a minimum level
of profitability and secures a long-term market presence. But, the ul-
timate success of the infringer's product is not due to the noninfring-
ing alternative chosen by the infringer. Indeed, the noninfrin g
239. Once again, other, plausible explanations are available. Indeed, the alternate
explanation developed supra in note 230, may apply here as well.
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alternative, if used from the outset, would have been unsuccessful.
Success in this market does not seem to depend so much upon a
brandname that signals a favorable marketing message at the level
where sales are made to consumers. Instead, success in this market
seems to depend upon convincing retailers to select and feature a
product. In this third scenario, the infringer's product ultimately suc-
ceeded because of the boost obtained during infringement. That
boost enabled the infringer to establish favorable relations with retail-
ers, and those relations were sufficiently established during infringe-
ment to enable the infringer, and its product, to reach profitability
after infringement.
This third scenario presents the most extreme example of how cur-
rent damage remedies potentially create perverse incentives to in-
fringe. Here, the nefarious competitor seeks to enter a market in
which retail capacity is crowded with successful products. An un-
tested brandname has little chance of gaining a toehold in a retail out-
let.240 Once again, the infringer avoids compensatory damages by
carefully selecting a trademark and producing a quality product. The
infringer also avoids damages under an accounting by shifting to a
dissimilar brandname before transactions become profitable. The in-
fringing brandname helps convince retailers to select and feature the
infringer's product, and the reputation earned during infringement
convinces retailers to continue to carry the infringer's product with
the noninfringing alternative. Here, the infringer's ultimate success
derives from the boost gained by knowingly infringing, but current
damage remedies do not deprive the infringer of the gains of trade-
mark infringement.24'
C. Taking the Difference Between Life Cycles
Following the approach developed thus far, the gains of trademark
infringement constitute the difference between the actual and the esti-
mated life cycles. Thus, a first step in measuring the gains of trade-
mark infringement is to calculate the infringer's gross revenues. This
calculation, which can be made from financial information discovered
from the infringer, is similar to the first step in the traditional account-
ing of profits. Because of the more comprehensive view urged by this
240. An innovator may actually seek to create this difficulty for subsequent com-
petitors by developing more than one brandname for its product. See Onkvisit &
Shaw, supra note 49, at 118 (explaining that "[o]ne strategy is for the innovator to
saturate the new market with more of its own brands, making it too crowded for
anybody else to enter and leaving no retail shelf space for potential competitors," and
citing the addition of Luvs by Proctor & Gamble to join its Pampers disposable
diapers).
241. In this case, the problems of measuring a reasonable royalty continue. In addi-
tion, an appropriate royalty in this case would actually be for the value of the entire
business given that, in the long run, the success of the business is due solely to trade-
mark infringement.
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discussion, the traditional limitations of an accounting should not ap-
ply. Gross revenues should be calculated for the entire life cycle of
the infringer's product, regardless of whether transactions were profit-
able or when the period of knowing infringement started or ceased.
The next step-and admittedly the most challenging one-is to de-
duct the gross revenues that would have been earned had the infringer
used the noninfringing alternative from the outset. Calculating these
revenues is similar to the second step in a traditional accounting of
profits. In an accounting, the infringer can deduct production and
marketing costs as well as any profits that can be attributed to any
enhanced product qualities provided by the infringer. Under the
more comprehensive view, the infringer can deduct the gross revenues
that the infringer would have earned absent infringement. Given that
both the actual and estimated revenues refer to the same product and
differ only in the brandname affixed to that product, there is no need
to account for different product qualities. Once this deduction is
made, the gains of trademark infringement have been calculated.
At this point, it should be apparent that the proposed model is not
limited to a context in which the infringer never engaged in a profita-
ble transaction during infringement. The model calculates the gains of
trademark infringement by taking the difference between the in-
fringer's revenues on the actual life cycle that included infringement
and an estimated life cycle that does not include infringement. It mat-
ters not, on the actual life cycle, whether infringement ceased before
or after the infringer reached the minimum level for profitability.
Consider, for example, that the trademark holder does not obtain an
injunction until the infringer's product emerges from introduction and
growth and establishes itself in maturity. By taking the difference be-
tween the actual and estimated life cycles, the model not only meas-
ures the benefits of increased sales and gross revenues on unprofitable
transactions, but also measures the benefits of increased sales and rev-
enues on profitable transactions.
It should also be apparent that the proposed model is not limited to
a context in which the infringer does not compete directly with the
trademark holder. The two life cycles that are used to measure the
gains of trademark infringement pertain to the infringer's product.
Because the approach is not compensatory, there is no need to ex-
amine any impact on the trademark holder's life cycle or, for that mat-
ter, to compare either the costs of the infringer and the trademark
holder or the prices that they charge. In fact, it matters not whether
there is any impact on the trademark holder's life cycle. Conse-
quently, it also does not matter whether the infringer and the trade-
mark holder sell products in the same market. By awarding the
trademark holder the difference between the actual and estimated life
cycles for the infringer, the model measures the gains of trademark
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infringement where the infringer and the trademark holder directly
compete as well as where they do not.
Finally, the proposed model is not limited to a context in which the
infringer switches to a noninfringing alternative when infringement
ceases. Indeed, it is altogether possible that the infringer will opt, in-
stead, to discontinue operations rather than to switch to a noninfring-
ing alternative. If that is the case, the proposed model still measures
the gains of trademark infringement. The actual and estimated life
cycles for the infringer will include the period of infringement and,
perhaps, a subsequent period in which the infringer winds up opera-
tions in an orderly fashion. Provided that a life cycle that does not
include infringement can be estimated for both the period of infringe-
ment and the winding up period, the approach will measure the gains
of infringement.
D. Estimating the Noninfringing Alternative
The challenge in applying this model is in estimating the gross reve-
nues that would have been earned had the infringer used the nonin-
fringing alternative from the outset. Because data does not exist to
measure these revenues directly, other sources of data must be used to
estimate these revenues indirectly. Actually, indirect estimates are
not uncommon. 4 Before a product is introduced, product managers
often forecast the life cycle of a product, 43 especially to determine
how soon the product will break even by reaching profitability.2 4 No
242. For example, in many contexts, both business and government, forecasts or
predictions of important variables are made to assist in planning decisions. See
Bowerman & O'Connell, supra note 179, at 3-4 (citing examples in marketing, fi-
nance, personnel management, production scheduling, process control, and strategic
management). In those contexts, the "forecaster analyzes [historical] data in order to
identify a pattern that can be used to describe [the data]. Then this pattern is extrapo-
lated, or extended, into the future in order to prepare a forecast." Id. at 5 (emphases
omitted). Here, the difference is that current data is examined to "forecast" a differ-
ent set of events that would have occurred in history.
243. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note 49, at 112. Onkvisit and Shaw state:
As explained by [one executive], "The number of entrants in a given cate-
gory has increased, and we find ourselves really working hard at projecting a
given brand's life cycle - when the bell curve is likely to peak and the point
at which it is no longer intelligent to support a given brand."
Id. (quoting an executive vice-president of Gillete (North America)). See generally
Dalrymple & Parsons, supra note 137, at 109-32 (providing an introductory discussion
of forecasting methods).
244. In fact, the forecasting of a "break-even" point is a standard managerial tool.
See Wasson, supra note 141, at 251-57 (presenting break-even concept in context of
price-cost and return-on-investment standards). When forecasting the break-even
point, managers now incorporate the S-curve of the initial portion of the typical prod-
uct life cycle. See Bowerman & O'Connell, supra note 179, at 17. As Bowerman and
O'Connell state:
In constructing this S-curve [to estimate sales during introduction and
growth], the company must use its experience with other products and all its
knowledge concerning the new product in order to predict how long it will
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longer do courts automatically consider such forecasts inherently un-
certain.345 Where, however, the forecast is for a new product or a new
brand of a product that does not have a history of performance, prov-
ing a forecast with reasonable certainty becomes difficult.2'
The challenge, in many cases, will be to find a reliable source of
data upon which to base a reasonably certain forecast of the revenues
that would have been earned had the noninfringing alternative been
used from the outset. 7 One source of helpful data is found in the
patterns of sales and gross revenues of third parties who compete with
the infringer and who used brandnames with which retailers and con-
sumers were not initially acquainted. Looking at the sales of other
products is not a novel suggestion. In traditional damage calculations,
evidence of the success of the defendant is admissible to show that the
trademark holder's loss of sales was caused by the unauthorized
use.248 Here, however, the success-or lack of success-of third par-
ties provides data that can help in estimating the shape of a typical life
cycle.
Using the sales of others to estimate the revenues that would have
been earned absent infringement is a viable alternative, but one that
may present practical problems in some situations. Certainly, those
who study product life cycles often estimate the typical path of sales
and gross revenues from industry studies. Such studies, however, may
not be practical in every trademark infringement action. Third party
competitors may not want to disclose financial information, and rules
take for the rapid increase in sales to begin, how long this rapid growth vill
continue, and when sales of the product will begin to stabilize.
Id.
245. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 cmt. b (1979) [hereinafter Re-
statement, Contracts] (stating that proof of lost profits "may be established with rea-
sonable certainty with the aid of expert testimony, economic and financial data,
market surveys and analyses, business records of similar enterprises, and the like").
At least one court used the trademark holder's own projection of revenues to deter-
mine lost profits on diverted sales by taking the difference between the estimated
revenues and the actual revenues. See U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 601 F. Supp.
1140, 1148-49 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd on oter grounds, 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986).
246. See Restatement, Contracts, supra note 245, § 352 cmt. b ("However, if the
business is a new one or if it is a speculative one that is subject to great fluctuations in
volume, costs or prices, proof [of lost profits] will be more difficult.").
247. Indeed, in time series analysis, the forecast of a product life cycle for a new
product "when historical data . . . either are not available at all or are scarce,"
Bowerman & O'Connell, supra note 179, at 16, is called "subjective" because it re-
quires "qualitative" forecasting methods where "the forecaster must first subjectively
determine the form of the curve to be used." ld. at 17-18.
248. See Restatement Third, supra note 2, §36 cmt. h. As the Restatement states:
Proof of a decline in sales combined with evidence tending to discount the
importance of other market factors, such as evidence of positive business
conditions and the success of similar businesses not subject to the defend-
ant's tortious conduct, can be sufficient to establish a causal connection be-
tween the plaintiff's decline in sales and the misconduct of the defendant.
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of civil procedure may not compel disclosure. Moreover, if new prod-
ucts with noninfringing brandnames are likely to fail-as in the sec-
ond and third cases-some competitors might not be able to provide
financial information for the simple reason that those competitors no
longer exist. Even where a study is conducted, the estimate should
account for any product qualities that differ between the infringer's
product and the average product of the study.
In theory, another source of data comes from financial information
discovered from the infringer. After the infringer adopts the nonin-
fringing alternative, the infringer's product continues to sell. The
change, however, is that the infringer's product starts on a different
path of sales and gross revenues. The starting point for the new path
is different because the infringer does not start anew. Rather, a differ-
ent starting point is determined by the boost that the infringer re-
ceived while using the infringing brandname. While the general shape
or functional form of the path may be the same, the rate of growth in
sales and gross revenues for the new path is different because the in-
fringer does not continue using a brandname with an established mar-
keting message. Rather, a different brandname, the noninfringing
alternative, does not immediately convey a valuable marketing
message and, thus, is associated with a lower rate of growth. Actual
financial information provides information about the rate of growth
associated with the noninfringing alternative. At least in theory, in-
formation about that rate of growth can be used to estimate the sales
and gross revenues that would have been earned had the infringer
used the noninfringing alternative from the outset.
A linear model best illustrates how to use financial information, dis-
covered from the infringer, to estimate the revenues that would have
been earned absent infringement.24 9 Figure 9 depicts such a linear
model. During introduction and growth, the actual path of sales and
gross revenues follows a straight line with a slope of bl. That slope, bl,
is the rate of growth with the infringing brandname. After the in-
fringer adopts the noninfringing brandname, the actual path of sales
and gross revenues follows a straight line with a different slope, b2.
That slope, b2, is the rate of growth with the noninfringing name. If
the infringer had used the noninfringing brandname from the outset,
the estimated path of sales and gross revenues would start at the ori-
gin and follow a straight line with the estimated slope of b2.
249. See generally id. at 137-54 (discussing forecasting techniques that use a linear
model).
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A linear model can rely upon straightforward regression techniques
to estimate the slope or rate of growth, but a nonlinear model must
turn to more sophisticated statistical techniques.-'0 In the linear
model, actual financial information of the infringer after adopting the
noninfringing alternative is easily isolated and examined to determine
the slope or rate of growth of a straight line. The linear model is
straightforward because the slope is unaffected by the starting point
from where the infringer began using the noninfringing alternative- 51
Product life cycle theory teaches, however, that the typical path during
introduction and growth is a nonlinear curve whose shape discloses a
changing rate of growth.25 The nonlinear model is complicated by
the fact that the shape of the curve, which depicts ongoing changes in
the rate of growth, is affected by the starting point3z53 Thus, in a non-
250. See generally Nicholas R. Farnum & LaVerne WV. Stanton, Quantitative Fore-
casting Methods 183-240 (1989) (introducing curvilinear trend models, including log-
arithmnic and exponential curves that resemble the S-shape of introduction and growtnh
periods).
251. In fact, all that is needed in the linear model is to shift the origin of the line
associated with the noninfringing alternative such that the y-intercept is zero. See
Bowerman & O'Connell, supra note 179. at 144 ("Such shifts of the origin of time are
common practice in forecasting.").
252. This much was apparent in the intuitive explanations of the different portions
of a typical product's life cycle as depicted in Figure 1. During "Introduction," there
was a positive slope but the rate of growth in sales and gross revenues was not yet
significant or dramatic. The rate of growth changes as the nonlinear path "curved"
into "Growth." During "Growth," there is also a positive slope, but the slope is
steeper, indicating a higher rate of growth on sales and revenues that is significant anddramatic.
253. See generally Bowerman & O'Connell, supra note 179, at 167-85, 308-16 (dis-
cussing forecasting techniques that use nonlinear or curvilinear model). The compli-
cation arises because the rate of growth in sales and gross revenues interacts with time
such that, during introduction and growth for example, the rate of growth fist in-
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linear model, difficulties arise because the infringer did not adopt the
noninfringing alternative until after the boost, well into introduction
and growth.
A solution to the difficulties of the nonlinear model potentially lies
in the techniques of nonlinear estimation and conditional probabili-
ties. Nonlinear techniques can estimate the kind of distribution or
nonlinear curve that a path of sales and gross revenues follows during
introduction and growth.254 Here, nonlinear techniques can examine
actual financial information for both the period of infringement and
the period when the infringer adopted the noninfringing
brandname.255 The result indicates the functional form or particular
kind of equation that best estimates sales and gross revenues for the
infringer's product, regardless of the brandname that was used or
when a brandname was adopted.
In theory, a conditional probability can estimate the parameters of
the distribution or nonlinear curve that is associated with the nonin-
fringing alternative. A conditional probability estimates the parame-
ters of a distribution or kind of equation given information that may
be unrelated to that distribution.25 6 Here, the unrelated information
is the arbitrary starting point from where the infringer adopted the
noninfringing alternative. Statistical techniques condition the distri-
bution upon that arbitrary starting point and then examine actual fi-
nancial information for the following period when the infringer used
the noninfringing alternative. The result indicates the parameters of
the distribution or kind of equation that best estimates the path of
sales and gross revenues when the infringer actually used the nonin-
fringing alterative. Armed with the nonlinear equation and the pa-
rameters that solve that equation, a statistician can estimate the
creases at an increasing rate and then increases at a decreasing rate. See id. at 115(providing graphical depictions); see also id at 167 (using a quadratic equation to
"consider the situation in which the average level of the time series is either increas-
ing at an increasing or decreasing rate or decreasing at an increasing or decreasing
rate").
254. For an example of a nonlinear model, using a logarithmic functional form, that
forecasts a growth curve resembling the S-curve of the introduction and growth peri-
ods, see Bowerman & O'Connell, supra note 179, at 18 ("In a product life cycle situa-
tion the use of an S-curve may be appropriate. But many other functional forms can
be used... [such as] an exponential curve ... [or] a logarithmic curve.").
255. Because historical data are available, quantitative-as opposed to qualitative,
see supra note 247-forecasting methods become available. See Bowerman &
O'Connell, supra note 179, at 20 ("These [quantitative forecasting] techniques involve
the analysis of historical data in an attempt to predict future values of a variable of
interest.").
256. See generally Ingram Olkin et al., Probability Models and Applications 85-106(2d ed. 1994).
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revenues that would have been earned had the noninfringing alterna-
tive been used from the outset.257
An additional concern arises from the need to account-as in the
first scenario-for an estimated path of sales and gross revenues that
is successful. Here, financial information discovered from the in-
fringer can indicate the minimum level of profitability or the number
of sales that will generate gross revenues that cover all costs, fixed and
variable. The estimated path will be successful if the distribution that
estimates gross revenues reaches that minimum level. As noted
above, after reaching maturity, a not unreasonable forecast is that the
path will follow a straight line whose slope is equal to the rate of the
growth of demand for the product market as a whole. Following the
linear model, the slope of that straight line can be estimated from the
rate of growth for the infringer's product after the noninfringing alter-
native was adopted and during maturity.2 s58
Where the estimated path of sales and gross revenues is successful,
the entire life cycle can be estimated by combining the nonlinear and
linear models. The initial segment of the path, during introduction
and growth, follows the distribution estimated by using the techniques
of nonlinear estimation and conditional probabilities. The second seg-
ment of the path, during maturity, follows a straight line whose slope
is estimated by using the technique of linear regression. The two seg-
ments join above the minimum level of profitability where the slope of
the nonlinear curve converges with the slope of the straight line.
Unfortunately, what can be designed in theory cannot always be
implemented in practice2 59 In particular, it is difficult to estimate the
parameters of a nonlinear curve by conditioning the distribution upon
an arbitrary starting point and then examining data for the period fol-
lowing that point. If the parameters of the distribution already are
known, it is relatively easy to estimate a curve that follows from an
arbitrary starting point. Working backwards and estimating the pa-
rameters from the curve that follows from the arbitrary starting point
is a different matter. A nonlinear curve depends upon parameters
that, in turn, are dependent upon each other, and current statistical
techniques cannot, with assurance, control for the effects of an arbi-
257. See icL at 537 ("[Any] subcollection of random variables ... can be predicted
from knowledge of the remaining variables through the appropriate conditional
probability distribution and associated regression function.").
258. Even where the product achieves maturity in a market that is subject to sea-
sonal fluctuations, dummy variables can be used to control for those fluctuations in a
linear model.
259. Indeed, to the extent that the product life cycle theory is questioned, a model
based upon product life cycles also is questionable. See Onkvisit & Shaw, supra note
49, at 98 ("Product life cycle has been criticized for being ambiguous and difficult to
measure in addition to having a low predictive value and for being inapplicable to
many products that are exceptions and do not behave as suggested."); see also id. at
99-102 (discussing debate over product life cycle theory).
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trary starting point when estimating all of those parameters. 260 Thus,
the very boost from unauthorized use that benefits the infringer may
also contaminate the statistical analysis and deny confidence in the
estimated parameters that are needed to measure those benefits.
The problems with currently available statistical analyses might be
addressed through burdens of proof. For example, the trademark
holder might be required to prove a linear model with the burden
shifting to the infringer to provide a better, nonlinear model. Or, after
estimating the type of nonlinear curve, the trademark holder might be
allowed to start that curve at the origin and force the curve through
the point where the infringer started using the noninfringing alterna-
tive.26' While both of these approaches would provide for damages,
both may underestimate the gains of trademark infringement. For ex-
ample, if a linear model is used because the infringer fails to provide a
better, nonlinear model, the estimated path will always result in a suc-
cessful product. This would underestimate the gains of trademark in-
fringement, particularly in situations that resemble the second and
third cases. Similarly, if the trademark holder forces the curve
through the point where the infringer started using the noninfringing
alternative, the estimated path will underestimate the boost in market
presence obtained by establishing favorable relations with retailers
during infringement. This also would underestimate the gains of
trademark infringement, particularly in situations that resemble the
first and third cases.
The solution to the problem of measuring the gains of trademark
infringement, however, is not to continue with the traditional limita-
tions of an accounting of profits. Infringers potentially benefit from
unauthorized use, even if infringers do not engage in profitable trans-
actions during the period of knowing infringement. While the dam-
ages model urged in this discussion has intuitive and theoretical
appeal, the model may have shortcomings in application. An industry
study is a viable alternative, but there may be practical problems in
some cases. So too, financial information discovered from the in-
fringer is an alternative, but here there may be practical problems as
well. And, altering burdens of proof may not eliminate those
problems. Those shortcomings do not, however, require that trade-
mark holders should be foreclosed from arguing for measures that
better serve deterrence and unjust enrichment rationales. This they
260. One way to gain an intuitive appreciation for this problem is to consider two
nonlinear equations that predict substantially similar paths in a first time period but
predict different paths in a second time period. Actual data taken from the first time
period are equally consistent with both equations, even though the equations will esti-
mate very different paths in the second time period.
261. This might be accomplished by using exponential smoothing techniques where
no historical values are available, an arbitrary initial value is chosen, and the curve is
exponentially smoothed between the arbitrary initial value and current data. See Far-
num & Stanton, supra note 250, at 200.
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cannot do if traditional limitations force them, and the courts, to disre-
gard the ways that infringers gain from trademark infringement.
CONCLUSION
The rationales for trademark infringement remedies have expanded
over time. Monetary relief was designed originally to compensate for
the trademark holder's losses where the infringer competed with the
trademark holder. Monetary relief now also serves the rationales of
deterrence and preventing unjust enrichment, rationales that are not
limited to contexts in which the infringer competes with the trade-
mark holder. An example of the kind of monetary relief that has
evolved to serve expanded rationales in expanded contexts is the
traditional accounting of profits. Once used only in limited contexts
as a surrogate for profits on sales that a competing infringer diverted
from the trademark holder, an accounting is now used in expanded
contexts to deter infringement and prevent unjust enrichment.
Unfortunately, the restrictions on damage calculations have not al-
ways expanded to keep pace with added rationales. The traditional
accounting of profits, for example, is limited to profits on transactions
made during the period of knowing infringement. The economic gains
of trademark infringement, however, are not constrained by the tradi-
tional limitations that courts long ago placed upon an accounting of
profits. Even if the infringer never engages in a single, profitable
transaction, unauthorized use may increase sales and gross revenues
and, thereby, reduce financial losses. So too, unauthorized use may
help the infringer obtain a favorable reputation among retailers and,
thereby, gain a market presence, the benefits of which may continue
after infringement ceases.
This Article has proposed a more comprehensive analysis that bet-
ter measures the gains of trademark infringement. This analysis, as a
consequence, better serves the rationales of deterrence and unjust en-
richment. To be sure, the analysis was initially developed with refer-
ence to a hypothetical infringer who never engaged in a single,
profitable transaction during the infringement period and then shifted
to a noninfringing alternative that was available at the outset. The
hypothetical was designed, perhaps dramatically, to highlight the defi-
ciencies of the traditional limitations of an accounting of profits.
Nonetheless, the approach was not meant to be limited to that con-
text. If monetary relief is meant to serve the deterrence and unjust
enrichment rationales that now underlie trademark remedies, mone-
tary relief should not be constrained by limitations that prevent dam-
age calculations from measuring all the gains of trademark
infringement.
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